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Executive summary 
 
This paper studies the effect of announcements by credit rating agencies (CRAs) on daily 
stock returns for firms listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) and rated by S&P, Moody's 
and/or Fitch. The analysis is performed by utilizing event study methodology. Our main focus 
is announcements of core credit rating changes, but we also examine watch list 
announcements and aggregated announcements 1. 
 
We find a significant negative abnormal return in the case of credit rating downgrades, while 
we find no positive abnormal return in the case of upgrades. The same pattern is revealed, 
although with a smaller negative abnormal return, regarding both watch list and aggregated 
announcements. 
 
The analysis is performed on several samples of sub-categories. We find that the effects of 
negative announcements are more significant and larger for small firms than for large firms. 
There is evidence that an unexpected rating downgrade, meaning if the issuer is not put on a 
negative watch prior to the rating change, has a larger impact. 
 
Our results indicate that CRAs, to some extent, provide the financial markets with new 
information. In particularly, this applies for negative announcements. The reason for this is 
possibly that good news travels faster than bad news. Issuers might publish goods news 
immediately, while they are not in the same hurry with bad news and use a 3rd party like a 
CRA for this purpose. Although our study shows a significant negative abnormal return on the 
day of announcement, a substantial part of the total negative return occurs within a 120 day 
period prior to the announcement. This indicates that most of the information provided by the 
CRA is already known in the market.  
 
We describe and discuss the most well-known points of criticism against CRAs and their role. 
Many of these cause potential conflict of interest. The close relationship between the issuer 
and the CRA, and the fact that the issuer pays for their own rating is one of them. Other 
potential conflicts of interest are caused by the major CRAs’ dominating role in the market 
and the establishment of ancillary businesses in addition to the rating business.  
                                                 
1 “Aggregated announcements” include rating changes, watch list placements and outlook placements  
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper seeks to study the effect on firms’ stock price related to announcements made by 
credit rating agencies (CRAs). We look at firms listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE), 
and which are rated by the major CRAs S&P, Moody's and/or Fitch. If there is significant 
impact on stock returns this could indicate that the CRAs are superior compared to the market 
both in terms of information access and information processing skills, thus implying leading 
ratings. On the other hand there has lately been speculation of lagging ratings, suggesting that 
the CRAs adjust their ratings according to information already reflected in a firm’s stock 
price.   
  
We use daily data around the press release of the rating action. Our main focus is on specific 
rating changes, meaning up or downgrades. These rating changes can be within in a rating 
class, across rating classes and across investment/speculative grade. In addition to testing the 
impact of direct rating changes we look at the impact when a firm has been put on a CRA’s 
watch list. To compensate for the limited number of rating changes in our sample, we perform 
additional sub-studies where we examine the effect of all positive and all negative 
announcements respectively, meaning rating changes, watch list placements and outlook 
placements. 
 
CRAs role and performance in the financial market has been highly debated, especially over 
the last decade with several large financial scandals like Enron and the ongoing subprime 
crises. Through the background presentation and the data analysis, we seek to give an insight 
in the CRAs role in the financial market. 
 
Most previous studies performed over the years deal with US data, although there has been an 
increasing interest for the topic in other parts of the world too. To our knowledge, this is the 
first study so far that focuses on firms listed on the OSE. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we provide background information 
regarding CRAs. This involves an explanation of their role, how they operate and 
interpretation of the ratings. We also try to enlighten and discuss the most important criticism 
raised against CRAs. In section 3 we present earlier studies on this topic, including results and 
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potential weaknesses. Section 4 presents the methodology we use to analyse the data material, 
and describes how this is done in various steps. In section 5 we present and discuss our data 
material more closely. Section 6 presents the results of our study. Section 7 discusses possible 
future studies involving this topic. In section 8 we conclude and sum up the results.    
 
2. Background 
 
2.1. Definition of a credit rating agency and a credit rating 
A CRA is a company that assigns credit ratings to issuers of debt and to the debt itself. Issuers 
are mostly companies and governments, but can also be non profit organisations and other 
users in need of funds. The rated debt can be issues such as bonds, preferred stocks and 
commercial paper. A credit rating reflects a CRAs opinion, at a specific date, of the 
creditworthiness of the particular issuer or issue. More specific one could say that for issuers 
the rating reflects the capacity and willingness to meet financial obligations, while for a single 
issue it is the specific creditworthiness for the given issue. The creditworthiness is the ability 
to pay back debt.2 Hence the risk measured in a rating is the probability of default.   
 
Long term ratings apply for the medium and long term horizon meaning 3-5 years. Over this 
horizon the objective of the rating is stability and it is not necessarily reflecting market 
volatility. Hence especially short term market volatility could be misleading in terms of 
creditworthiness. The rating should be globally consistent and measured on a standard scale. 
 
S&P states3 that a rating is not 
i) A recommendation to buy or sell investments. A high rating does not imply that the issue or 
issuer is a good investment, and vice versa. A rating is just an opinion how likely it is that 
given issuer or issue is going to meet its obligation. 
ii) A way of defining good or bad companies. The risk measured is not trading risk or loss 
given default, it is the probability of default for the given issuer or issue. 
iii) An audit. CRAs normally rely on the information given by the issuer and its own auditor. 
CRAs are neither liable as auditors are. 
 
                                                 
2 Creditworthiness can also be defined as the expected loss rate, which again is the product of expected default 
rates and expected loss severity rates in the case of default (Moody’s Investors Service (2002). 
3 Habir (2004) 
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2.2. Credit rating agencies main role 
The main role of CRAs is to provide the financial market with an independent and objective 
framework, or benchmark, for comparing the credit quality of securities.  This is done by 
grading the creditworthiness of an issuer or issue within an alphabetical system. By 
differentiating creditworthiness the market becomes more transparent, which again leads to 
greater efficiency in the capital market. CRAs serve as a third party who, through their 
independent position and access to management, sort information available in an objective 
way. By doing so, CRAs reduce the asymmetry of information between issuers and investors.  
“To the extent that they are specialists in obtaining and processing information about default 
risk, the actions of rating agencies reduce lenders’ information-gathering costs and thereby 
facilitate the operation of security markets”4. Thus, CRAs help minimize volatility without 
firms having to disclose all product secrets and strategy choices to the market.  
 
In addition CRAs have a major disciplinarian effect. Without the existence of CRAs, issuers 
would have fewer incentives to publish bad news, as it would be less likely to be revealed. As 
the issuers want to seem credible towards the market they have to publish bad news as the 
CRAs most likely will publish this anyway. If bad news only was published by the CRAs this 
would lead the market to believe that the issuer is trying to hide information, resulting in lost 
credibility for the issuer. Hence, the existence of CRAs disciplines the issuers and makes 
them publish non-favourable information to a greater extent. 
 
2.3. Development 
CRAs have over almost a century become an essential part of the international financial 
system. In the US, where the major CRAs have their origin, CRAs made their “breakthrough” 
earlier than in the rest of the world. As their opinion of creditworthiness over the years has 
become more important for investors and other markets participants seeking information, 
there has been an increased use of CRAs.  There are several reasons for this increase in 
numbers and influence of CRAs5. First of all there has been a tremendous amount of new 
issues that need to be rated. Especially the latest years there has been an increased leverage 
amongst issuers. As shown in Chart 1 below the number of issuers has in addition grown 
                                                 
4 Creighton et al. (2004) 
5 Habir (2004) and U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (2003) 
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substantially. The chart also shows the development in different parts of world, implying the 
more recent growth of issuers in other parts of the world than the US.  
 
Chart 1: Market development issuers (Habir 2004) 
 
Second, there has been an increase in new and different issues, like structured papers, which 
require ratings6. The increased numbers of issuers and issues has made the debt market much 
more liquid, and thus created an escalated need for CRAs.  
 
One could also argue that globalization has contributed to the increased importance and 
influence of CRAs over the years by causing a free flow of capital. This free flow of capital is 
one explanation behind the increased number of issuers and issues, which again require credit 
ratings from CRAs.  
 
Due to the Basel II agreement 7 regulators allow banks to use certain CRAs when calculating 
their net capital reserve requirements. As a consequence of this, CRAs are also used outside 
                                                 
6 Habir (2004) also claims that there has been disintermediation and a growing interest in credit among investors. 
In addition the greater volatility of bond spreads and its impact on equity has contributed to the increasing 
influence of CRAs. 
7 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision issued, through Basel II, recommendations on banking laws and 
regulations. Basel II was initially published 2004, but has been updated several times. Its main purpose is to 
create an international standard for banking regulators to be used when creating regulations on how much capital 
banks need to put aside to guard them against various types of financial and operational risks. The rule in Basel 
II imply that the greater risk a bank is exposed to, the greater the amount of capital the bank needs to hold to 
insure its solvency and overall economic stability 
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the capital market which creates more need for their services. According to S&P there is a 
strong demand for CRAs services which is likely to persist.  
 
2.4. Market 
The global market of CRAs is highly dominated by the major US agencies Standard and 
Poor’s Division of the McGraw-Hill Companies (S&P), Moody's Investor Service, Inc 
(Moody’s) and Fitch Inc (Fitch). Moody's started rating bonds in 1909, while S&P and Fitch 
both got into the business in the early 1920s. S&P have credit ratings outstanding of about 32 
trillion, and Moody’s and S&P both have ratings in over 100 countries8. S&P, Moody’s and 
Fitch are all “national recognized statistical rating organisations” or NRSROs.  
 
A NRSRO is a CRA that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) permits other US 
financial firms to use for regulatory purposes. NRSRO status is meant to show that the CRA 
is considered to be reliable, and is hence a global sign of quality. In addition to S&P, Moody’s 
and Fitch there are four other, smaller, NRSROs around the world9.  
 
2.5. Importance of ratings for market participants 
Credit ratings play an important role for the financial markets, and the various market 
participants utilize ratings in different manners. 
 
2.5.1. Issuers 
Issuers use credit ratings to ensure the market of their creditworthiness and thereby attract 
capital at a more favourable price. By using CRAs they disclose information of their business 
to the market, and hence make it transparent. This should provide the market with an 
independent judgement of creditworthiness.  In most cases involving major issues the issuer 
uses several CRAs. A study by the bond market association10 even shows that some market 
participants prefer three ratings. By using several CRAs the issuers assures the market of their 
creditworthiness. In the long term corporate debt market, a single rated issue would most 
likely be priced below an issue with more ratings. Hence the absence of multiple ratings could 
be interpreted negatively in a way that the issuer is not capable of obtaining several equivalent 
                                                 
8 www.sap.com,  www.moodys.com and www.fitch.com 
9 www.sec.gov/answers/nrsro.htm 
10 The Bond Market Association (2006) 
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good ratings.  Sometimes CRAs make ratings without being requested to do so by an issuer, 
this is often referred to as an “unsolicited” rating. 
 
2.5.2. Buy-side firms and investors 
The largest buyers of issues are large institutional investors as mutual funds, pension funds 
and insurance companies. These firms make extensive use of credit ratings in their investment 
decisions. The information from the CRAs is included in their own analysis.  Here it is 
functioning both as a benchmark and a supplement in portfolio monitoring. In a survey11 
amongst investors, it is stated that the most important function of CRAs for these is internal 
risk management. Ratings are also used to adapt to internal or regulatory rules which many of 
these buy-side firms have to comply with. Many pension funds can for example not invest in 
issues below investment grade, or need an issue to be rated by several CRAs in order to be 
allowed to invest in it. 
 
Despite the fact that CRA assessments on creditworthiness are not indented to be used for 
equity purposes12, it seems likely that stock holders, to some extent, consider ratings when 
investing in equity. If this is the case, our study should show effects on stock prices in the 
case of rating actions by CRAs.  
 
2.5.3. Sell-side firms 
A typical sell side firm is a broker or investment bank which makes recommendations of 
issues and trades these. Ratings are used when calculating the risk for a portfolio. In addition 
to their own analysis they use credit ratings in a similar way as the buy-side firms and 
investors. They may also use credit ratings in an overall assessment when analyzing a stock. 
 
2.5.4. Private contracts 
The use of conditional rating criteria as a debt covenant in private contracts is common. This 
is when ratings are being used as triggers to protect the investor from an issuer losing 
creditworthiness. Through implementing debt covenants like rating triggers in a private 
contract the investor can demand accelerating repayment of his loan in case the rating goes 
under a specified level. 
                                                 
11 The Bond Market Association (2006) 
12 As mentioned under section 2.1 what S&P states that a rating not is 
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2.5.5. Regulatory use of ratings 
In general the object behind ratings having a regulatory role is to use ratings to measure and 
limit risk taken by regulated entities. As described under section 2.3, Basel II gives CRAs a 
role in the determination of banks regulatory capital13. The regulatory use of CRAs can 
roughly be divided into an US and EU approach14. Norway, although not a member of the EU, 
follows through the membership in the IOSCO15 and CESR16  the same guidelines as EU 
countries.     
 
In the US the regulatory role of CRAs is substantial, and only the NRSROs can be used for 
regulatory purposes. For instance, money market funds can only invest if the security is rated 
in one of the four highest classes17. Hence, the decisions of large US investors are directly 
affected by the CRAs rating actions.   
 
In the EU the regulatory role of CRAs is not as developed as in the US18. Bank regulators can 
use external credit assessment institutions (ECAIs) recognized as eligible by the national 
authorities for regulatory purposes. If an ECAI is considered eligible by one EU country this 
ECAI may be used in the other EU countries as well. However, contrary to the US and its 
NRSROs, ECAIs do not have to be CRAs.  Other criteria are also somewhat different as the 
SEC to a great extent look at the market acceptance when deciding on NRSRO status, while 
ECAIs on the other hand are rather picked based in the credibility of their ratings19.  Hence, 
this contributes to a weaker regulatory role in the EU, and Norway, compared to the US. 
 
2.6. Entry barriers to the CRA market 
One could assume that the entry barriers to the CRA market should be quite low, as anyone in 
theory can rate issuers and issues, and publish the rating. But, as when building up any other 
                                                 
13 In Norway Basel II has been implemented over the latest years and is expected to finalize during 2008 
(Kredittilsynet 2007 ) 
14 Champsaur (2005) 
15 International Organisation of Securities Commissions 
16 The Committee of European Securities Regulators 
17The Investment Company Act of 1940 ensures money market funds only invest in securities rated in the two 
highest categories (Creighton et al 2004). 
18 Champsaur (2005) refers to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Credit rating on Complementary 
Sources of Credit Quality Information, Working paper No. 3 (200) which states that most EU countries do not 
rely on the CRAs for regulatory purposes, except for the purpose of evaluating market risk. 
19 Champsaur (2005) 
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business, a good reputation and credibility are crucial factors. This applies maybe even 
stronger for the CRA market, as there is an asymmetric information problem between CRAs 
and the investors, who are the customers making decisions based on the assessment product. 
CRAs base these assessments often on non-public information, thus leading investors to trust 
the rating blindfolded. This creates a significant trust factor within the market for CRA, 
consequently making it difficult for new agencies, with no track record, to enter. In addition 
there is a great need of expertise and knowledge when assigning a rating. Hence the entry 
barriers in the market are very high, and S&P, Moody's and Fitch are, as mentioned under 
section 2.4, highly dominating the market.   
 
The biggest barrier for entering the CRA market is the NRSRO criteria. The NRSRO label is 
a sign of reliability, and is also a necessary condition for regulatory purposes. Thus, having a 
CRA without this status rate an issue can give the market a reason to doubt its 
creditworthiness, consequently creating a problem for the issuer when raising funds. 
Therefore most issuers want their CRA to be a NRSRO. To achieve NRSRO status the CRAs 
first have to achieve national recognition status, which is hard to accomplish when issuers 
prefer NRSROs. It is the SEC that determines this status20. Likewise it is crucial for CRAs to 
have ECAI status in order to overcome market barriers. Although, one could argue that the 
NRSRO’s criteria is more acknowledged.  
 
Nevertheless there has been an increase in the number of smaller CRAs. As of today there are 
about 130 CRAs worldwide21.  Though, in spite of this increase in CRAs, the dominance of 
the major agencies still remains, mainly caused by the market barriers of recognition in the 
market. 
 
2.7. Rating process and procedure 
S&P, Moody’s and Fitch approach the rating process in a similar way. The issuers and issues 
to be rated are categorized by i) industry and ii) type of issue, like commercial paper or senior 
unsecured. A rating committee is usually formed to initiate, withdraw or change a rating. The 
committee supervises the given issuer and issue in the case of new information which could 
                                                 
20 According to Champsaur (2005) the SEC has proposed more precise criteria for granting NRSRO designation. 
If this is adopted a CRA will not be recognized as a NRSRO based only on the national recognition criteria but 
also need to be recognized depending on the credibility of their ratings. This may lead to lowering entry barriers.  
21 Basel II study 
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affect the rating. A committee usually consists of a lead credit analyst, junior analysts and 
managing director or supervisors. Each member’s opinion is then heard and taken into 
account. The rating decision is then based upon a majority vote by the committee. The 
frequency on which a rating is changed, or reconsidered, varies depending on the type of 
issuer and the security being rated. Specific events, like mergers or other major transactions, 
are watched and considered for implications on creditworthiness, and these can typical lead to 
an uneven frequency of rating actions.  
 
2.8. Data used by CRAs 
The rating committees’ decision is based on an ongoing contact with the issuer and periodic 
meetings with the management are common. Usually it is the lead credit analysts’ 
responsibility to present the available information and data to the rest of the committee. The 
amount of information which is reflected by the rating symbols is significant, and this 
information can be financial and non-financial, as well as public and non-public. 
 
2.8.1. Financial and Non-financial factors 
Information involves both financial and non-financial risk factors22. Financial risk is the risk 
that a firm’s cash flow will not be sufficient to meet its obligations. This consists amongst 
others by the issuer’s financial measures as cash flow and leverage. Non-financial risk is the 
risk that the cash flow of a firm will be negatively affected by adverse economic conditions, 
making it difficult to meet operating expenses. This is typically factors like market conditions 
and potential outside risks as government regulations.  
                                                 
22 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (2003) sums up the typical subcategories of i) financial and ii) 
business risk factors 
i) Financial risk: Cash generation or use, balance sheet strengths, debt ratios, interest coverage ratios, operating 
cash flow to total debt ratios and fixed charge ratios 
ii) Non financial (business risk): stability of markets, diversity of markets, efficacy of operation, peer group 
analysis, competition and market positions and government regulations 
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2.8.2. Public and non-public information 
The information used by the CRA can be both public and non-public23. Public information is 
obviously information that the public has full access to. Stock price trends, interest rate levels 
or financial statements are examples of such public information. Non-public information is 
typical information that the company does not want to reveal to the public. Typical non public 
information can be information on a possible merger or acquisition. A reason for keeping this 
information secret is due to the firms competitors. Hence non-public information is usually 
only given based on a contract of confidentiality between the CRA and the issuer.   
 
2.9. CRAs notification to issuer regarding rating action 
The CRA normally notifies the issuer about rating action, and gives the possibility of 
appealing before the rating is made public. The issuer has then the opportunity for a certain 
amount of time (few hours to a few days) to review the information. During this time they can 
ensure that the information contained in the rating report is not inappropriate or discloses 
confidential information to the market.  If they decide to appeal, the issuer has the opportunity 
to present new or additional data. However, the CRA only changes the rating if the presented 
data is relevant and/or if publishing the rating-report would cause disclosure of confidential 
information.  
2.10. Disclosure and transparency 
S&P state24 “In accordance with industry rules and regulations, information about ratings 
changes is not released to anyone else prior to it being published. Once the information has 
been published and the press releases have been sent out, it is available in the public domain.” 
The major CRAs make the rating action available from their websites free of charge once it is 
released. Normally the basic assumptions regarding a rating change are disclosed with the 
                                                 
23 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (2003) sum up the typical subcategories of i) public and ii) non- 
public information 
i) Public: News reports, industry reports, bond and stock price trends, data from central banks and proxy 
statements 
ii) Non-public:  Credit agreements, acquisitions, private placement memoranda, business projections and other 
information that is not revealed to the public. 
 
 
24 S&P analyst Sarah Frommlet in an e-mail to us 
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press release free of charge. For more details, like the full rating rapport regarding the action 
or historical ratings, there is typical a fee for subscribers. The rating report specifies the 
assumptions and rationale for the given rating change.   
 
The general rationale and methodology behind the rating and the procedure are available at no 
cost from the CRAs website. CRAs also publish default studies for the various rating 
categories.  
 
2.11. Rating symbols and terms 
The system for symbols and terms regarding the ratings is similar for S&P, Moody's and 
Fitch. 
 
2.11.1. Rating symbols 
Ratings are based upon giving alphabetical combinations symbolizing the creditworthiness. 
There are two main categories of creditworthiness; investment grade and non investment 
grade, or speculative grade. Speculative grade is also known as junk bonds. S&P and Fitch 
use the classes AAA, AA, A and BBB as investment grade, and BB, B, CCC, CC, C and D 
are speculative grade. For Moody's investment grade are the classes Aaa, Aa, A and Baa, 
while speculative grade are Ba, B, Caa, Ca and C. To modify the classes into specific notches 
the CRAs utilize additional symbols. S&P and Fitch use plus and minus, while Moody's uses 
numbers from 1-3 with 1 indicating that the given rating is in the higher end of the rating 
category, 2 indicating mid range and 3 indicating that the rating is in the lower end. There is a 
nonlinear relationship between default rates and rating classes. The increase in default 
probability in association with a one notch downgrade within speculative grade is larger than 
for a notch change within investment grade25.  
 
CRAs distinguish between ratings of long term and short term issues. Short term issues are 
normally debt with a maturity of one year or less, as commercial paper. When rating 
commercial papers the main focus for the CRA is the issuers’ liquidity, or in other words how 
easy it is for the issuer to supply cash to repay the issue at maturity26. Long term issues are 
normally issues with maturity beyond 1 year, such as senior unsecured papers. Our focus is on 
                                                 
25 As indicated in Chart 2 in section 2.12  
26 Tirole (2006) 
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the impact of long term rating changes, as we explain under section 5, and we don’t pay more 
attention to short term ratings. Long term ratings are based on a creditworthiness assessment 
for a medium to long term horizon27 
 
2.11.2. Rating outlook 
In addition to ratings CRAs publish rating outlooks determined by the rating committee to 
indicate the future ratings.  A rating outlook is based on a medium term horizon. Moody’s 
typical uses an 18 month horizon28. Outlooks are usually categorized as negative, positive or 
stable. S&P also uses the category developing meaning that the direction of the rating is 
uncertain. Outlooks do not necessarily imply a rating change, or that the issuer or issue is put 
on watch list.  
 
2.11.3. Watch list 
The watch list is used during the continuous work with the ratings. It focuses on more short 
term trends or identifiable events. If an issuer is put on watch list it implies that its rating is 
under consideration. The possible change in rating will normally take place within 90 days. 
To maintain an objective view there normally is a separate committee for placing an issuer on 
the watch list and one for removing it. The different categories are positive, negative or 
developing, meaning that the direction is uncertain. S&P, Moody's and Fitch use somewhat 
different terms, but the interpretation is the same. The watch list hence gives a signal to the 
market that the rating is under active review for change. Historically between 66% and 76% 
                                                 
27 To illustrate the exact interpretation of the long term ratings we show S&P definitions, but both Moody’s and 
Fitch definitions are quite similar. S&P (Habir, 2004) interprets the long term ratings symbols as follows (Habir 
chooses not to articulate for all classes) 
 
AAA:  “Highest rating… obligor’s capacity to meet financial commitment is extremely strong.” 
A: “Somewhat more susceptible to adverse changes in economic conditions... capacity to meet financial 
commitment is still strong” 
BBB: “Adequate protection... but changes in economic conditions could lead to weakened capacity…” 
BB: “Faces uncertainties during adverse economic conditions.. “ 
B: “Possesses current capacity... but likely to be impaired...” 
CCC: “Vulnerable to non-payment... needs favourable business climate to meet obligations...” 
 
28Moody’s Investors Service (2002) 
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of all ratings put on the watch list have been changed in the indicated direction29. As with 
rating changes issuers are notified in advance before being placed on the watch list. 
 
2.12. Performance 
The work performed by the CRAs raises the question whether they actually are correct in their 
opinion on creditworthiness. Data show that bonds with higher ratings have lower subsequent 
default rates than lower rated bonds30, which hence should imply that the CRAs’ performance 
actually is good. This is illustrated in Chart 2 below showing the average cumulative 5 year 
probability of default for ratings by S&P. 
 
Chart 2: Average cumulative 5-year probability of default 
 
Data for Moody's show that companies recently upgraded are about twice as likely to be 
upgraded again the following year compared to companies recently downgraded or which had 
no rating action31.  
 
In total, CRAs’ own performance data show good results regarding predicting default 
probability. As CRAs have incentive to only publish favourable information, and maybe 
                                                 
29 Moody’s Investors Service (2002) 
30 S&P (2001) referred to by Creighton et al. (2006) 
31 Moody’s Investors Service (2002) 
20 
 
present this in a misleading way, one could doubt these results. But also independent studies 
show similar results. Altman (1989)32 finds the cumulative default rate over the first ten years 
of a bonds life to be 0,1% for AAA and  31,9% for B. 
 
Although the various data show that CRA ratings match the actual outcome, the self-fulfilling 
nature of ratings brings the results into doubt. The self-fulfilling nature of ratings is the 
possibility that a downgrade causes a negative market reaction leading to decreased 
creditworthiness. The same rational applies for upgrades. Hence, the rating action itself can 
lead to fulfilling the opinion reflected by the rating.   
 
2.13. Criticism 
The role of CRAs has been highly debated and criticized, especially the last decade. The last 
years of criticism has in particular been boosted by the Enron-scandal, which led to several 
reports on the role of CRAs. The most important reports are by the SEC33 and the IOSCO34. 
According to the SEC, CRAs “in some cases appeared simply to take the word of Enron 
officials when issues where raised, and failed to probe more deeply” 35 
 
Charlie Brown, general counsel for Fitch Ratings, stated in an interview regarding Fitch’s role 
in the case of Enron: ''We're not advisers, and we're not insiders,'' …..''We don't have any 
special relationship with the companies we rate. It's unclear to us what anyone thought we 
ought to have done differently''36. 
 
On a more general basis, CRAs further claim that their opinion of creditworthiness can be 
compared to a journalist engaged in free speech, implying that they cannot be held 
accountable for their belief. Einhorn (2007) conversely argues that the opinion from a CRA 
on a firm’s creditworthiness is based on special assumptions, since they can be considered as 
an insider due to their insight in non public information. In addition they should also, 
presumably, be experts in processing this information. Hence, the ratings cannot just be 
                                                 
32 Referred to by Tirole (2006) 
33 The SEC (US Securities and Exchange Commission) ordered in 2002, as a result of the Sarbanes – Oxley Act, 
“Report on the Role and Function of Credit Rating Agencies in the Operation of the Securities Markets”.   
34 IOSCO (International Organisation of Securities Commissions) Code of Conduct from 2004 came as a result 
of the “Report on the activities by Credit Rating Agencies” 
35 SEC refers to the Staff report issued in connection with the investigation of Enron by the Senate Committee on 
Governmental Affairs. 
36 Wyatt (2002) 
21 
 
ignored by investors like a journalist whom one doesn’t agree with can be ignored. Increased 
criticism towards CRAs leads to a lack of faith in their ratings. As the market has less 
information than the CRAs, this creates a problem for market participants when making 
investment decisions. Some of the most common criticism against CRAs is presented below. 
 
2.13.1 Slow reaction 
One of the most discussed topics is the CRAs’ eligible slow reaction to new information, and 
that they do not downgrade firms quickly enough. The collapse of Enron is a good example of 
this.  Enron’s rating remained at investment grade until just a few months before the collapse, 
this despite the fact that the CRAs were aware of many of the problems37.  
 
Moody’s state38 that they take rating action only “when it is unlikely that it will be reversed 
within a relatively short time”. The CRAs explanation for this practice is due to the concern of 
stability in ratings. This seems plausible as a rating should reflect the long term 
creditworthiness and not short term volatility.  Although this practice can seem beneficial for 
all parties, in the case of adverse development in creditworthiness it may benefit only the 
issuer, as the underlying problems will not be instantly revealed to the market. The issuer then 
has the opportunity to take care of the problems without having to worry about skeptical 
investors which would result in more expensive, or no, funding. A possible explanation for 
the slow reaction by the CRAs can hence both be the self-fulfilling nature of a downgrade and 
the close relationship to the issuer. 
 
2.13.2. Close relationship between CRA and issuer 
During the process of giving a rating, and maintaining this, the issuer and the CRA work 
closely together. Historically, subscribers paid for ratings from CRAs39. This however 
changed during the 1970 when CRAs instead began charging issuer. The reason for this 
change was the need for more extensive and time consuming ratings which would be hard to 
deliver to single investors. In addition there was a great deal of free riding, in a sense that if 
one investor purchased a rating the other investors had less incentive to purchase the same 
                                                 
37 Wyatt (2002) 
38 Løffler (2002) 
39Tirole (2006) 
22 
 
rating.  Normally CRAs charge issuers for the type of issue to be rated, which is divided in an 
initial amount and a periodically maintenance fee.   
 
The fact that issuers pay for its own rating causes a substantial conflict of interests. It may 
lead to giving the CRA wrong incentives towards the issuer. By giving a rating that pleases 
the issuer, the CRA could make sure that their customer is happy and continues doing 
business with them. CRAs however claim that this is not the case, and to prevent it CRAs’ 
revenues are supposed not to depend on a significant single issuer. Additionally, an analyst’s 
payment is independent from what the issuer pays, meaning that the analyst receives the same 
payment no matter which issuer he rates. 
 
By giving incorrect ratings due to a close relationship, CRAs would in the long run ruin their 
own reputation. The problem with this argument is that a CRA’s reputation will not be 
damaged until there really is a problem, which can take a very long time. The situation can be 
compared with the topic regarding an airplane company’s concern on safety; you don’t know 
if it is safe or not until it actually crashes. One could argue that it might be profitable for the 
airplane company to focus less on safety since there is only a small chance of this being 
revealed by a crash. The same applies for CRAs as the profitability is weighted against the 
relatively small possibility of default for high rated issues or issuers. 
 
A good example of CRAs’ cautiousness towards downgrading major issuers is given by 
Einhorn (2007). S&P changed in August 2007 their long term credit outlook on Bear Stern 
from stable to negative. Bear Stern was having major problems and the decision was correct. 
The very modest change in the assessment of creditworthiness shocked the market. To avoid 
any damage to Bear Sterns the analyst from S&P, shortly after the announcement, made a 
comment that “the market reaction today is overplayed”. In the time after this Bear Stern 
struggled with massive problems, which finally led to the purchase by JP in 2008 for a price 
far below the trading price before the crisis. In the light of Bear Sterns major problems there 
should have been a substantial downgrade. If S&P in fact had access to information indicating 
problems at an early stage, this downplay of the seriousness of the situation could possibly 
indicate the negative consequences of the close relationship between issuers and CRAs.  
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2.13.3. Performance 
The performance of CRAs is related to the issue of the close relationship between the CRA 
and issuer mentioned above. The Enron scandal raised criticism about the performance of 
CRA analysts, and thus questioned the quality of the analysis.  
 
In general, CRAs state40 that a rating is not an audit, and that they rely on the information 
given them by the issuers. Trough this confidence in the information given by the issuer the 
CRAs may, intentionally or non-intentionally, ignore flaws in the information that is crucial 
for the given rating. The Technical Committee of the IOSCO (2008) state that “some 
members of the task force believe that in some cases some CRAs relied on information that, 
on its face, appeared questionable or, in the broader context of rapid market changes, 
uncertain or of dubious quality.” Also in the case of performance the analogy for the airplane 
companies’ safety concern applies; it is hard to observe bad performance until it is actually 
revealed by a major scandal. Hence, the confidence in the issuer by the CRA can lead to poor 
performance by not investigating the information more thoroughly. 
 
2.13.4. Oligopoly 
A survey41 amongst 41 major issuers all over the world shows that most issuers choose S&P, 
Moody's and/or Fitch. Minor CRAs used are DBRSs, R&I and A.M. Best. The chart below 
illustrates this survey. The number 1 to 5 illustrates the degree of usage, with 5 meaning that 
the average issuer always uses the particular CRA. Hence, Chart 3 on the next page tells us 
that the average issuer uses Moody's, S&P and/or Fitch almost exclusively when issuing debt. 
A similar survey for the preferences of investors shows the same pattern.  
 
This lack of competition in the market for CRAs can have several negative consequences. 
Firstly, it may have a harmful effect on the development of new CRA methodologies. As 
there is no competition the CRAs don’t have to make an effort to come up with new and 
improved methods. This can lead to diminishing quality in ratings. Secondly, it may result in 
oligopoly or monopolistic pricing. If there is no competition and issuers are depending on 
ratings, the CRAs are free to price their services accordingly high. This can lead to issuers 
overpaying for ratings and thus a lack of efficiency in the market.  
 
                                                 
40 Habir (2004) 
41 The Bond Market Association (2006) 
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Chart 3: Survey regarding choice of CRA 
 
Data42 indicates that S&P, Moody's and Fitch control 85% of the market for CRAs. The 
CRAs’ profit from this dominance is significant as the demand for credit rating has been 
increasing.  For instance, Moody's has an operating profit on sales of 54%43. The CRAs are of 
course not interested in losing their oligopoly position with such substantial profit margins. 
 
2.13.5. Ancillary business by CRA 
Over the latest years CRAs have started new lines of business in addition to the strictly rating 
business. Examples are risk management services and consulting to issuers. CRAs then get a 
role as an advisor on how a rating would change in the case of different endogenous and 
exogenous scenarios. This position as both the advisor and evaluator regarding structuring and 
rating issues may lead to perverse incentives for the CRA.    
 
Ancillary business by CRAs can be compared with the conflict when an investment bank has 
both an analyst department and a brokerage department. In theory the departments should be 
totally separate, but one could argue that this is not always the case. Typically, the phrase that 
                                                 
42 The bond market association (2006) 
43 Einhorn (2007) 
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there are Chinese walls between the two departments is used. Chinese walls are thin and quite 
low so that one can still communicate in spite of the walls. This communication can be both 
intended and unintended. Chinese walls could be the case for CRAs also. CRAs however 
officially claim that the different departments are well divided, and state that the rating 
committee has no connection to the other businesses, and vice versa.  
 
If the phenomena of Chinese walls is applicable for how CRAs operate the core rating service 
together with other ancillary business, this could result in ratings being impacted by whether 
or not an issuer choose to purchase other services provided by the CRA. Also, the analysts 
might feel pressure towards giving the same score as the advisors consulted for, if one of 
these hypothetical scenarios does occur44.  
 
2.13.6. Transparency 
Over the years CRAs have been accused for not publishing enough information on how they 
operate and the methodology behind the rating decision. Knowing the logic behind the ratings 
is obviously crucial for investors. In addition, CRAs’ exemption from regulation FD makes it 
hard, not to say impossible, for investors to observe what assumptions and data a CRA has 
founded their rating on. As a result of pressure by amongst others the IOSCO45, CRAs have 
improved their transparency substantially over the latest years. 
 
Although critics claim that especially market participants who don’t have the same capability 
as major investors still struggle with the transparency issue. One of the most discussed topics 
is the need for more comparable historic rating data from the various CRAs. Through this it 
would be easier to evaluate the different CRAs against each other. 
 
2.13.7. Structured products 
Structured products are securities with various types of underlying assets as collateral, and 
with different rights and privileges. They can be used to raise more capital at a better price 
                                                 
44 In the IOSCO Code of Conduct from 2004 the CRA is “encouraged to separate, operationally and legally, its 
credit rating business and CRA analysts from any other businesses of the CRA, including consulting businesses 
that may present a conflict of interest.” 
45 The IOSCO had an impact on improving CRA transparency trough CRA code of conduct in 2004. Here there 
are described principals on which CRAs are meant to base their own code of conduct. 
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than might be possible through ordinary mechanisms46. Einhorn (2007) argues that the main 
reason behind the subprime crisis is not as many believe, predatory lending- loans at high 
interest rates to individuals who are not able to pay back. In Einhorns opinion the main reason 
is the fact that lenders of all sorts have lent too much money with too little interest to 
compensate for the risk involved. The reason for this again is structured products. Structured 
products should in theory be dispersing risk, but this is done by separating the loan originator 
from the outcome of the loan. The loan originator gets a fee upfront, while the risk is 
transformed over to for example structured products as CDOs47.  The risk of these is 
measured by a credit rating performed by a CRA.  
 
The underwriter of a structured product gives the CRA information that is not revealed to the 
public because of the CRA’s exempt from regulation FD48.  This makes the CRA the most 
suitable to evaluate them. Here lies a substantial conflict of interest. Einhorn makes a point 
out of the fact that Moody's state that a reason for investing in Moody's is to participate in the 
growth of structured products. By this Moody's say they believe in a growth for structured 
product, a growth that Moody’s themselves can contribute to by giving convenient ratings.  
 
The conflict of interest for the CRAs may lead to the observed tendency of rating grade 
inflation in structured finance. Instead of using the same rating scale for bonds, CRAs use so 
called idealized rating default rates for the various ratings. This idealized rate for a municipal 
bond at a given rating is less than for a corporate bond, which again is less than for an asset 
backed security which is less than for a CDO. More concretely put, it is more likely that a 
AAA-rated security of the CDO category defaults, compared to a municipal bond49.  
 
Hence, you cannot compare the ratings across categories. The system creates arbitrary 
opportunities for issuers through constructing instruments with a higher rating then the 
                                                 
46 Technical Committee of The International Organisation of Securities Commissions (2008) 
47 Collateralized Debt Obligation, a structured security based on fixed-income assets 
48 Regulation FD prohibits an issuer of security, or person acting behalf of the issuer, from communicating non-
public information. The SEC exempted CRAs from regulation FD so that they could develop credit ratings and 
make this public. (US SEC Final Rule: Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading (Regulation FD)) 
49 According to S&P’s long-term data the 10 year default rate on an A rated municipal bond is 1%, while a 
CDO’s is 2,7% (Einhorn 2007). 
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original rating, and thus contributing to a growth in demand for structured products.50 This, 
coincidentally, also happens to be CRAs most profitable product.  
 
2.13.8. Level of public disclosures by issuer 
There has also been raised criticism towards the issuers. The issuer might hold back relevant 
information if he feels there is a substantial risk of the CRA abusing the information in self-
interest, or that it in another way will not remain confidential. This is a major conflict of 
interest as CRAs could profit from being in such an insider position. Issuers on the other side 
would of course suffer if the confidential information was leaked, but they are also dependent 
on sharing a certain degree of information so that the CRA can assure potential investors of 
their creditworthiness.  
 
Further, due to certain debt covenants like rating triggers, issuers may be reluctant to disclose 
all relevant information to the CRA. If knowledge of the existence of such rating triggers 
leads the CRA to lower a rating score, it may create a vicious cycle. As mentioned a rating 
trigger accelerates the payback of a loan if a firm’s rating goes under a specified level. 
Through the worsened liquidity, creditworthiness would be affected which again could have 
an adverse impact on other agreements.  In worst case, several loans would become due at 
once which could drive firm to bankruptcy. Thus, rating triggers can cause additional 
volatility.  
 
Hence, the existence of rating triggers is not favourable information for an issuer, and they 
have been accused for not disclosing this information sufficiently to the public. Rating 
triggers was one of the reasons behind the collapse of Enron. US government, through the 
SEC, now require the disclosure of such triggers51. 
 
 
 
                                                 
50 In Einhorns speech he illustrates an example of this pointed out by Nomura securities. “if you took a AA+ 
rated asset backed security and repackaged it all by itself and called the repackaged instrument a CDO, it 
becomes AAA, because the CDO  has a higher idealized default rate than the asset backed security” 
51 SEC (2003) 
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2.14. Possible solutions to criticism 
A possible solution to several of the issues mentioned above could be a more competitive 
market amongst the CRAs. This would lead to more pressure on the CRA-margins and a more 
healthy market. First of all it would cope with the difficulties with the oligopoly position of 
the major CRAs described in section 2.13.4. Second, more competition would give incentives 
for the CRAs to improve performance to maintain their position. Through the existence of 
more CRAs the issuers would have to choose the ones with the best track record to convince 
potential investors. This again could lead to a faster reaction by the CRA in terms of 
downgrades, as the focus would shift from a close relationship with the issuer and satisfying 
him, to making the best possible analysis.  The problem with creating a more competitive 
market is that market entry barriers are very high, as described in section 2.6. Market barriers 
could be lowered by abandoning the NRSRO status system. Though, this solution could lead 
to several negative consequences as the standards towards CRA would be lowered as a result. 
Thus, the lowering of market barriers would possibly lead to a lower standard for the total 
market. Contrary, the use of a governmental approved status for CRAs could also stimulate 
new entries. But the criteria for this status must be reformed if this is to be the outcome.  
 
To prevent the problem of interest with ancillary business by the CRAs, one could simply 
make the CRAs focus strictly on the rating business by prohibiting ancillary services such as 
consulting52. This would, as for many of the other potential solutions, be opposed by the 
CRAs as they profit on the current situation.  
 
A survey by the bond market association53  show that regarding transparency investors say 
that CRAs have improved over the last years, but many feel there is still need for 
improvement. The survey shows that 39% of the issuers think that the quality of the analytical 
performance has improved. Also investors feel that the CRAs have improved on these topics. 
Further improvement could be achieved through more frequent reporting and increased public 
disclosure. The latter could consist of revealing even more info about the rating history of 
each CRA, and make this information more comparable among the various CRAs. 
 
                                                 
52 IOSCO (2003) does not prohibit ancillary services but states: “The CRA should separate its credit rating 
business and CRA analyst from any other businesses of the CRA, including consulting business, that may 
present a conflict of interest” 
53 The Bond Market Association (2006) 
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Another suggested solution, regarding transparency, is to change the structure in the market 
by making the issuers share all information disclosed to the CRA with the entire market. This 
could be achieved by eliminating CRAs exemption from Regulation FD. Such a reform would 
make issuers react within following two extreme alternatives/scenarios. Either, issuers would 
choose the extremely conservative alternative, and eliminate all non public information-access 
for the CRA, in fear of sharing such sensitive information with competitors. Contrary, issuers 
could choose the extremely liberal alternative, and keep sharing non public information with 
the CRA, though this also would imply sharing with all competitors. Neither of the extreme 
alternatives seem very likely. The conservative one will impair a CRA’s assessment data 
significantly, and the liberal alternative would probably ruin a firm’s competitiveness. Thus, a 
likely outcome would be somewhere in between. As it is only if issuers choose the extreme 
liberal alternative that a CRA would have access to the same amount of information as it has 
with today’s exemption of Regulation FD, such a reform would impair their rating 
assessments. In addition, by removing the exemption one would leave the CRAs with no 
advantages compared to the market. This would terminate CRAs’ privileged position in the 
market, and make CRAs unnecessary in many ways. Hence, they would oppose this very 
strongly.  
 
Regarding the lack of disclosure from the issuers, a proposed solution is to assure issuers of 
the confidentiality of the information shared. This could be done by CRAs increasing the 
focus on procedures and mechanisms to protect the non public information54 given by the 
issuers.  
 
The conflict of interest regarding the close relationship where the issuer pays for the rating 
can be solved by letting subscriber’s pay for the rating55. The major CRAs will of course 
oppose this, as their high margins would decrease as a consequence of possible free riding 
amongst subscribers. Thus, it would be challenging to charge subscribers for these services. 
Also, the issuers may want to keep the current system, as they in many ways benefit from the 
close relationship with the CRAs, as possibly observed for Enron or Bear Sterns. To improve 
                                                 
54 Recommendation by the IOSCO (2003) 
55 Egan Jones is a CRA that is selling its ratings to subscribers instead of charging issuers. This is also the case 
for other smaller CRAs, but the logic behind this is that they are forced to charge subscribers as large issuers are 
not willing to pay for rating from a CRA that is not as recognized as the S&P, Moody's and Fitch. 
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the performance, which is closely linked to the relationship with issuers, CRAs should adopt 
procedures and mechanisms to promote quality and integrity in the rating process56. 
 
Regarding the problem with structured products, one solution could be to rate the different 
instruments at a single scale with the same implied creditworthiness. This would make the 
creditworthiness of structured product much more transparent and comparable. CRAs would 
resent dislike such a change because of their high profit on these types of ratings. But most 
importantly, the fact that there are so many different structured products with various 
underlying collateral and different rights and privileges would complicate an effort of creating 
a single rating scale.  
 
As a result of both SEC and IOSCO reports, the consensus amongst market participants seems 
to be that most of the conflicts of interest are best solved through CRA self regulation and 
increased level of disclosure. This would result in improved reliability for ratings57. Thus, 
there is a strong belief that there is no need for substantial new rules from the regulators58, and 
that the market is best suited to improve itself, given that CRAs adopt some of the measures 
recommended.  Although, it does not seem likely that the CRAs voluntarily will adapt 
measures that imply decreased profits. 
 
3. Previous literature   
 
A number of studies regarding the effect of rating changes and the role of CRAs in the 
financial market have been performed. Most studies look at the effect of rating changes for 
different financial market regions (countries). The studies often differentiate between the 
effect on stock returns and bond prices. In general the effect is quite small, but most studies 
show a certain effect of rating changes. Most studies find that the impact is greater for 
downgrades than for upgrades. Mtolcsy and Lianto (1995) say that the reason for this could be 
that good news travel fast compared to bad news, hence implying that investors place more 
weight on downgrades than upgrades. One could also argue that firms have incentive to 
promptly release positive information, but on the other hand downplay and postpone negative.  
                                                 
56 Recommendations by the IOSCO (2003) 
57 Champsaur (2005) 
58 The CESR does in its Technical advice not recommend the increased use of regulatory requirements as the 
impact of this on the competition in the market is unclear (Champsaur 2005) 
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We separate between US studies and other studies. 
 
3.1. US studies 
Many early studies originate from the US and thus look at US data. The advantage with using 
US data is that there in general are more observations of rating changes due to the earlier 
developed market for CRAs. The minor disadvantage though is the strong regulatory role 
CRAs play in the US, as described in section 2.5.5, and how this has a large impact on which 
investments are made. Hence, the results in the US studies are partly a consequence of this. 
 
One of the most referred papers on the topic is by Holthausen and Leftwich (1986). They use 
data for firms listed on the New York and American stock exchange, and which are rated by 
Moody's and/or S&P, over the period 1977-1982.  In total they look at 1014 rating revisions. 
The paper finds significant negative abnormal returns as a consequence of rating downgrades. 
However, it finds little evidence that a rating upgrade is followed by a positive abnormal 
return. Holthausen and Leftwich additionally test watch list placement for abnormal returns. 
Also in this case, the findings are significant negative abnormal returns in association with 
negative announcements and positive, but not significant, returns with positive 
announcements. They also find that abnormal returns to a great extent occur in the period 300 
days prior to announcement, meaning that the information the rating is based upon already is 
known in the market. 
 
Hand et al. find the same results as Holthausen and Leftwich (1985) regarding stock returns. 
They also test for bonds and similarly find a greater negative impact by a downgrade than a 
positive impact by an upgrade. They find that for both bond and stock prices there is a 
significant larger impact of an unexpected rating, meaning when the issuer has not been put 
on watch list prior to a rating change. There is also evidence of a greater impact on the 
abnormal return by a downgrade below investment grade. Both studies have the advantage 
towards European studies that they utilize a much larger sample size. Hand et al. use daily 
data which makes it easier to isolate the event date. 
 
Wakeman (1978) 59 looks at monthly data. He finds that there is no significant abnormal 
return at the time of a rating. This may be caused by the data infrequency, and is a potential 
                                                 
59 Referred to by Holthausen and Leftwich (1986) 
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weakness of the study. Although, there are other studies that use a lower frequency in their 
data, such as Katz (1974)60, and which do find significant impact on returns.   
 
3.2. Other studies 
Studies for other countries have made its entry as CRAs have become more established in 
other parts of the world. The most obvious weakness is the relatively small sample of events 
compared to US studies, especially for early studies.  
 
Barron et al. focuses on the UK financial market, and on the effect of rating changes on stock 
returns. What makes the study quite unique is that they differentiate between ratings on long 
and short term (commercial) paper. Most other studies, and in particular American studies, 
just focus on long term papers.  For long term papers they find, like Hand et al, and 
Holthausen and Leftwich, significant negative abnormal returns following a downgrade, while 
there is little evidence of impact by an upgrade. They find a similar tendency in the data for 
commercial papers.  Regarding the effect for watch list data they find, contrary to most other 
studies, significant positive abnormal return followed by a positive watch list placement, 
while there is no evidence of any significant abnormal return in the case of negative watch list 
placement. A possible reason for this result, and also a potential weakness, is their limited 
sample of watch list events. They find that the change of a rating class has a significant higher 
effect then the change within a class. In this case there is also a stronger negative effect of a 
downgrade, then a positive effect of an upgrade. Unlike other studies they examine the effect 
of rating changes related to the firm’s volatility and hence the cost of capital. The results give 
little support for the hypothesis that rating changes have effect on stock return volatility. 
 
Creighton et al. (2004) examine the impact of announcements from the CRAs in Australian 
financial markets. More specifically they test the effect on stock prices and yield spreads. 
They find evidence that both prices move in the direction indicated by the announcement, or 
in other words that a negative announcement leads to negative abnormal return, while a 
positive one leads to positive return. As Barron et al. they also find a significant impact from 
changes across rating classes. This particularly applies for ratings crossing from investment to 
speculative grade. The effects are larger for small firms. Further they observe significant 
                                                 
60 Referred to by Holthausen and Leftwich (1986) 
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negative abnormal return over the period (100 day window) preceding the day of 
announcement. This could imply that ratings only validate already known information. A 
weakness with the study is that it aggregates announcements, to compensate for a small 
sample. More precisely the aggregated sample includes actual rating changes as well as watch 
list placements and outlook placements. By doing so, they mix different types of 
announcements which each gives different information to the market. Through this they 
possibly get smaller, but more significant, abnormal returns.  
 
Mtolcsy and Lianto (1995) also look at Australian data. They find like Hand, Holthausen and 
Leftwich, Creighton et al, that the effect of downgrades is significant, but that this is not the 
case for upgrades.  
 
3.3. Our study vs. previous studies 
The most obvious difference in our study compared to previous studies is that we look at 
firms listed on the OSE in Norway. To our knowledge this has not been done in any former 
study. An explanation for this lack of previous research is the limited use of CRAs by firms 
listed on the OSE. Our data shows that most of the rating action has been performed post year 
2000 and also in the most recent part of this time period. The fact that we investigate a quite 
new market gives us the opportunity to look at the initial impact by the use of CRAs. The 
disadvantage of our study on Norwegian data is the limited amount of observation in our 
sample. The US studies represented by Holthausen and Leftwich and Hand et al. have a much 
higher number of observations in their sample which increase their reliability. Most of the 
other studies mentioned also have a somewhat higher number of observations compared to 
our study, but not nearly as high as the US studies.  
 
Compared to the US studies an advantage for our study is that Norway does not have the same 
strong regulatory framework. In the US, this forces large instructional investors to sell issues 
related to specific downgrade intervals, and thereby creating an excess supply of the 
downgraded issue. Furthermore this affects the bond price and interest rate in an adverse 
manner for the issuer, resulting in higher financial cost. Also in regard of stock return this 
might have a negative affect for the issuer. On the contrary, our results can be said to be free 
from this biasing regulatory role, and lead to more isolated event results.  
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We differ from the study by Wakeman through using daily data which gives us the possibility 
to isolate the event to a greater extent. This is also done by all other mentioned studies. The 
use of daily data strengthens our test. 
 
Like Hand et al and Creighton et al. we remove contaminated events that can influence our 
results. By doing so, we are able to a greater extent separate the effects caused by other events 
from the effect of the actual rating event. 
 
The sub-categories we examine are mostly based on well-known and interesting categories 
from previous studies. To further distinguish our study we test sub-categories that have not 
been examined before. We test the effect of downgrades over several notches vs. only one, 
and investigate how the impacts from being placed at watch list and downgraded at the same 
time are. We also look at the effects of outlooks published by the CRAs, in addition to the 
effect of watch list placements performed by several other studies. Through this we try to 
discover if, presumable, increased severity of the announcement leads to stronger results. As a 
consequence of our low sample we test the effect of aggregated announcements61, positive or 
negative. This is previously only performed on the Australian financial market by Creighton 
at al.  
 
4. Methodology  
 
In theory stock prices should reflect all public known information about a firm’s future. 
Hence stock prices in a perfectly efficient market should adjust immediately as new 
information reaches the market. This is, however, not always the case. Sometimes information 
is leaked prior to the public announcement by the firm, and often it might take some time for 
the market to fully interpret the news. To measure how a stock price responds to new 
information we make use of an event study.  
 
The essence of an event study is to analyze the impact of new information. This is done by 
checking for abnormal return on a stock at the time of a news release. In our case such a news 
release is an announcement of a change in rating, watchlist or outlook status. To determine the 
abnormal return we must first find the stock’s normal return. This is done by studying stock 
                                                 
61 Rating changes, watch list placements and outlooks 
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return and market return during an estimation window, and gives us the market model. The 
abnormal return is subsequently determined by deducting the normal return from the actual 
return during an event window. To test the statistical significance of the results we apply a 
two sided t-test. Our analysis is based on methodology from MacKinlay (1997), and we 
utilize the same formulas and notations used by him.  
 
In the following we briefly describe the procedure, determine the various steps for our 
analysis and explain the rationale behind these.  
4.1. Identify the event date 
The event date is the point in time when the market first apprehends the new information.  
The more accurate you can identify the event date, the more powerful the test will be, and the 
more able you are to accurately measure the impact of the new information. Event studies can 
be performed using various data frequency. The most common however is daily data. The 
reason for this is that data with lower frequency (for example months) often is too infrequent 
to isolate the event from the period before and after the event. Thus other value-relevant 
events than the one we want to examine might influence the stock price, and consequently 
contaminate the event study.  
 
In our study the event date is the date when a rating, watchlist or outlook action is announced 
by the CRA. We use daily data in our analysis to isolate our events effectively. 
 
4.2. Define the event window 
The event window is the number of trading days preceding and following the event date. This 
is the time period we suspect, and wish to analyze for, abnormal returns. In general, the more 
unnecessary days you include in the event window, the less powerful the test will be for the 
entire window. Hence, by being more certain about the event date we can minimize the 
needed event window and thus maximize the strength of the test. It is normal to include some 
extra days around the event to account for lags and leakages in the market, but more 
importantly to gather the effect from non-trading days, and news received in the market after 
trading has terminated for the day. When defining how large the event window should be it is 
necessary to consider the expected degree of information leakage. Leakages respond to a 
situation where information on a rating is leaked prior to the public announcement and thus 
giving individuals with access to this leaked information the possibility to adapt their 
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positions in the related firm accordingly. For extremely certain event dates, with little or no 
chance of leakage, the event window is often set to plus minus 10 trading days. For more 
uncertain dates with higher chance of leakages the window is often set to plus minus 30 
trading days. In sum, the essence is that the event window should be wide enough to cover the 
entire effect of the event, but also be adequately narrow for the results to be statistical 
significant. By adding too many days one also risks including the effects of other events on 
the return. 
 
In our case we can pinpoint exactly at which day the event occurs. In theory we could also 
narrow it down to the time of day the rating action announcement is made. Although, we do 
not have access to this information and hence concentrate us on the date the announcement is 
made on the CRAs website. We consider the amount of leakages prior to a rating change to be 
very limited due to industry regulations62.  
 
Though the date of rating announcement is easy to define, we apply a plus minus 20 days 
event window to be certain of grasping over all the possible affected days. Despite assurance 
from the CRAs of minimal leakages one can never know if this is correct. Even if no leakages 
occur, the players on the financial market might anticipate a downgrade to some extent under 
certain circumstances and thus price reactions may occur prior to the event date. Another 
reason for expanding the event window is to account for the fact that rating announcements 
sometimes are made at a time when the market in Norway is closed, and that the financial 
market often use some time to fully reflect new information in equity prices. To improve our 
tests further we also analyze distinct time periods within the event window to detect abnormal 
return in more detail. These shorter event windows, referred to as event slots, also help 
improve statistical significance as mentioned earlier. The event slots we have chosen to focus 
on are the following ten periods:  
-20 to 20 / -10 to 10 / -20 to -1 / 1 to 20 / 0 to 2 / -2 / -1 / 0 / 1 / 2 
 
                                                 
62 S&P state that “in accordance with Industry rules and regulations, information about ratings changes is not 
released to anyone prior to it being published. Once the information has been published and the press releases 
have been sent out, it is available in the public domain”. (S&P analyst Sarah Frommlet in an e-mail to us) 
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4.3. Define the estimation window 
The estimation window is a period of time when no event has occurred. The intention is to 
estimate a stock’s normal return, or in other words how it would have behaved in the absence 
of an event. Essential issues to consider are the statistical significance of the estimated 
parameters, and their relevance as predicting parameters for the event window. There is a 
trade-off between these two issues. From a statistical perspective a long estimation period 
would be preferable due to the significance of the estimators, while from the economical 
viewpoint it is of importance to keep the estimation window short enough to be relevant for 
the event window. We choose an estimation period of 100 days. This is in line with previous 
studies63, and is an adequate compromise between reliability and relevance. With this 
estimation window we get very few regression parameters with less than 5% significance 
level64, and the relevance for the event window should be adequately addressed. In sum this 
provides us with a statistically strong and relevant event study. We use daily data also for the 
estimation window, as this always should be in accordance with the frequency in the event 
window. 
 
It is most common to define the estimation period as the period of time before the event 
window. Depending on the availability of data, it also occurs that the event window itself is 
used in the estimation window, but this should be avoided if relevant data in the time period 
preceding the event window is available65. The reason for avoiding such overlaps is that the 
impact of the event itself should not be included when estimating normal return. Reflecting 
the abnormal returns from the event would be contamination. We have chosen the period prior 
to our event window, so that our estimation window is placed from day -120 to day -20, and 
are thus avoiding contamination in this case.  
 
MacKinlay’s model also opens for adding a post-event window to the estimation window to 
estimate the normal return model. By doing so the aim is to increase the robustness of the 
normal market return measure, to account for gradual changes in its parameters (i.e. alpha and 
beta). We do not consider rating changes to be a fundamental change in a firm’s riskiness, and 
thus have not included such a post-event estimation window. 
 
                                                 
63 Creighton et al. (2004) 
64 10 of our 95 estimated β s have a p-value of more than 5%.  
65 This is a typical issue when detecting abnormal returns concerning an IPO  
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The time line for an event study can be illustrated as in figure X underneath, tying together 
the event date, event window and estimation window (and post-event window if relevant).  
 
Figure 1: Time line of an event study (MacKinlay 1997) 
 
The following notations will be utilized in our study66. Returns will be indexed in event time 
using τ. We define 0=τ  as the event date, in our case the rating action. 1T=τ  to 2T=τ  
represents the event window, and 0T=τ  to 1T=τ  represents the estimation window. We 
let 011 TTL −=   and 1122 +−= TTL  represent the length of the estimation window and the 
event window respectively. This notation facilitates the use of abnormal returns around the 
event day in our analysis. Illustrated underneath is a more specific figure of our event study, 
and the parameters we have chosen. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Time line of our event study 
 
4.4. Select the sample of firms 
There are some important screening criteria to consider when choosing the firms to be used in 
the event study. First, one must decide from which stock exchange and/or industry to gather 
firms for the analysis. Usually this happens as a natural step during the thesis formulation of 
one’s study. Second, it is of importance to check that the firm has enough trading days to 
avoid problems of infrequent trading. Too low frequency biases the returns and the stock is 
thus not considered suitable for an event study. Another essential criterion is to avoid firms 
with more than one major event over the estimation period or event window. The implication 
of several value-impacting events is that it makes it difficult to distinguish between the 
                                                 
66 MacKinlay (1997)  
Estimation Event window 
τ = 0 
T2 = 20 T1 = -T0 = -
  100   41 days 
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different events, and hence decide which event is driving the stock price. Hence we want to 
remove these events because of contaminating effects.  
 
In our event study the sample of firms are listed on OSE and rated by S&P, Moody's and/or 
Fitch. We find these companies to have enough trading days to avoid problems with 
infrequent trading. The firms are checked for other major events67.  
 
4.5. Calculate “normal” (nonevent) returns  
The normal returns are the returns which should occur in the absence of the event. This 
normal return is determined by using an asset-pricing model. There are several types of asset-
pricing models, but MacKinlay (1997) loosely groups them into two categories, statistical and 
economic. Statistical approaches follow statistical assumptions and do not depend on any 
economic arguments. Economic models, such as the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
and Fama-French three factor model68  are also based on statistical assumptions, but do in 
addition rely on assumptions concerning the investor’s behavior. According to MacKinlay the 
advantage of using economic models lies in its possibility of including economic restrictions 
to calculate more precise measures of the normal return. However, MacKinlay also discuss 
biases related to economic models, and that the additional factors add relatively little 
explanatory power. Hence, the statistical Market Model is his preferred asset pricing model.  
 
The market model is CAPM’s empirical counterpart. Researchers debate on how many 
independent variables to use for predicting the expected returns in the regression. We have 
chosen to use one independent variable in our study, the single-index market model (risk 
adjusted return method). Our choice of only one is based on the fact that several independent 
variables have not proven to improve the predictability notably. As the name suggests, the 
single-index market model relates the return of a given security to the return of the market 
portfolio. A broad representative index is often used as a good approximation of the market 
portfolio. Though, in our study we have not used such a proxy, but applied the actual index, 
OSEBX (Oslo Stock Exchange Benchmark Index). We chose to use regular (nominal) returns 
for our study. Using excess returns are more in line with the CAPM but the difference is 
                                                 
67 More on this under section 5 
68 Fama and French (1993) and (1996) referred to by MacKinlay (1997) 
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minor, and the previous studies we have looked into ignore this issue. For any security i the 
market model is 
itmtiiit RR εβα ++=  
2)var(),0(
iitit
E εσεε ==  
Where itR  and mtR  are the security and market return in period t respectively, and itε is the 
residual disturbance term with constant standard deviation and zero mean. The parameters iα , 
iβ  and 2iεσ are to be estimated with the market model for each single event during the 
estimation windows.  
 
When predicting normal return for a few of the earliest events in our sample we have applied 
the mean return approach. This is a simpler technique than the risk adjusted return method, 
and predicts normal return in the event window to be the same as the mean return in the 
estimation window. We have used this method due to lack of data on OSEBX in the related 
time period.  
 
4.6. Estimating the market model 
We use a linear Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method to estimate the market model. This is a 
commonly used method, and is applied on the data from the estimation window to give us the 
necessary parameters for predicting normal returns in the event window. The regression given 
by OLS-method minimizes the sum of squared residuals. OLS assumes constant variance over 
time and no autocorrelation.  
Given these assumptions OLS is unbiased and efficient. For company i the calculations of the 
parameters in the estimation window are 
 
 
 
In our study  measures the relationship to the OSEBX index and  gives the intercept of 
the regression line with the y-axes. 
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4.7. Calculate abnormal returns 
Abnormal returns (ARs) are the actual returns that occur over the event window because of 
the event, minus the normal returns that should have occurred over the event window without 
the event, that is, nonevent returns. Given the parameters from the market model one can 
measure and analyze the abnormal returns. 
ARs for stock i can be defined as , where  is the sample of L2 for AR for 
firm i in the event window. By using the market model to find the normal return, the sample 
AR can be defined as 
 
 
According to the null hypothesis, the abnormal returns are normal distributed with zero 
conditional mean and conditional variance equal to 
 
The conditional variance has two components, the disturbance variance and the additional 
variance due to the sampling error in the parameters, α and β.  
 
MacKinlay (1997) claims that because of serial correlation on the abnormal returns the 
variance regarding the sample errors goes to zero as the estimation window, L1, increases. 
Hence the variance left will be the one caused by the disturbance 
 
Given the null hypothesis that an event has no impact on the behaviour of returns (mean or 
variance), the distribution of the sample AR of a given observation over the event window is 
)(,0( 2 ττ σ ii ARNAR ≈  
In our study the null hypothesis hence is that a rating change has no impact on returns (mean 
or variance).  
 
4.8. Aggregation of ARs 
When testing the null hypothesis we aggregate the ARs over similar events and also cumulate 
over time. While explaining the methodology, we for simplicity note the average aggregated 
abnormal returns for AR and the cumulative average abnormal returns forCAR , like done by 
MacKinlay. When describing the results in other sections we us the terms AAR and CAAR 
respectively for the aggregated average. By utilizing different combinations of events and 
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time, we check for significant impacts within the sample of events and within the event 
window. To start with, the non-aggregated cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is the sum of 
the ARs, and can be defined as 
 
Asymptotically as L1 increases, variance of CARi   is 
 
In the process of accumulating across securities one has to assume that there are no overlaps 
in the event windows of the various securities to avoid clustering. The absence of clustering 
assures that the ARs and CARs will be independent across securities. 
If the event window L1 is small, the variance of the CAR should be adjusted for the effects of 
the estimation error in the normal model parameters.   
The CAR  and variance aggregated for all companies is given by 
 
and 
 
 
In our study we assume that the event window L1 is wide enough to assume that the variance 
regarding the sample errors goes to zero. 
 
4.9. Determine the statistical significance of the ARs and the CARs 
Inferences about the CAR s can be drawn using  
. 
As the real  is unknown, one can estimate the variance by using the variance for the market 
model. Finally, the null hypothesis H0: CAR  = 0, that the abnormal returns are zero, can be 
confirmed or disconfirmed by a two sided t-test:   
 
This distribution result is asymptotic with respect to the number of securities N and the length 
of the estimation window 
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When testing a null hypothesis one also has an alternative hypothesis to test against. In such a 
study the alternative hypothesis (H1) would be that the average CARs are statistically different 
from zero, H1: CAR  ≠ 0.  
 
The H0 is normally tested on a 99%, 95% or 90% confidence level, with critical t-values 
calculated using N-2 degrees of freedom69. N is here the sample size and 2 is the number of 
estimators. The p-values we extract from these t-values give the probability of obtaining a test 
result at least as extreme as the one actually observed, given that the null hypothesis is true. 
Based on the p-values one then can determine whether the null hypothesis should be rejected 
or not. A p-value of 0,05 or less implies that it is less than 5% probable to get this result if H0 
is correct. Thus, one rejects the null hypothesis for a p-value less than 0,05 at a 95% 
confidence level.  The same logic applies for 99% and 90% confidence levels. We look for 
significance in our results for all three confidence levels.  
 
5. Data 
 
We examine companies that are both listed on OSE and rated by S&P, Moody's and/or Fitch. 
S&P and Moody’s have captured almost the entire market for issuers listed on OSE. Fitch has 
only a small share of the rating activities. Our sample of rating announcements covers a time 
period from April 1991 to April 2008, though the majority of events are post year 2000. In 
total we found the following 10 companies that match our criteria: 
• DnB NOR Bank ASA 
• Norsk Hydro ASA 
• Norske Skogindustrier ASA 
• Ocean Rig Norway ASA 
• Petroleum Geo Services ASA 
• SAS AB 
• StatoilHydro ASA (previously Statoil)    
• Storebrand ASA 
• Telenor ASA 
• Yara International ASA 
                                                 
69 Regarding samples of 3 events or less we have deducted 1 from the degrees of freedom. We acknowledge that 
this is a manipulation, and hence does not give us correctly estimated p-values.   
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Our focus is on long term credit ratings. In particular, from Moody’s we use: Senior 
Unsecured – foreign ratings, or Long Term Issuer Rating – foreign, when the former is not 
given. From S&P we use: Issuer Credit Rating, and from Fitch we use a general rating class 
(no particular name given). We choose to not test the effect of rating changes for short term 
papers. The reason for this is the very limited amount of samples we have regarding this, and 
that most of this data complies with long term ratings.  
 
We treat simultaneous rating changes by the different CRAs as one event. If there is both a 
rating change and a watch list or outlook placement on the same date, we also treat them as 
one event, and focus on the announcement type with strongest signalling effect70. The reason 
for treating as one event is that though several CRAs react to the same information and 
choose to downgrade at the same time, it is still only one independent event. Intuitively we 
understand that if, hypothetically, there are 100 CRAs and all of them downgrade a firm at the 
same date, counting this as 100 independent events would give great significance for the 
result, without this being correct. Hence, we have removed these types of events. 
 
It is also necessary to adjust for non-credit-rating-related events within the event window 
when choosing our sample of data. Typical events we adjust for are surprising earnings 
announcements (discovered by looking for extreme returns related to the earnings 
announcement), mergers & acquisitions and public offerings. We consider these events to be 
of such significance that they affect (contaminate) the stock return and thus make it difficult 
to isolate the rating announcement. We have also removed an event if the stock return, within 
the event window, acts in such an extreme way that it does not seem plausible that a rating 
action would impact in such strength. When categorizing these contaminated events we have 
distinguished between events which without any doubt should be removed, and the events 
which we have some doubts about removing, but still remove in our main study. In addition 
we have a small sub-study which includes these events that we were not sure about removing, 
called “including contaminated data”. The events we typical have added back in this sub-
study are the ones related to earnings announcements and extreme volatility. For a detailed 
summary of events we have removed permanently and which we have used in the 
contaminated sample see Table A-1 and Table A-2 in the appendix.  
                                                 
70 The signalling order is 1) Rating change, 2) Watch list placement, 3) Outlook placement. 
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To uncover the contaminating events we use the Newsweb service for OSE71. By doing so we 
find that some of the rating changes not are announced here. OSE states72 that there are no 
particular rules at OSE for informing the market regarding rating changes. Whether the rating 
is informed to the market through Newsweb depends on if the information is considered to be 
inside or not. If the information is regarded inside it is the company’s duty to inform about it 
on Newsweb. Hence, some rating changes will reach the public either through word of mouth, 
media or the respective CRAs website, where the information initially is posted73. If the 
market is not efficient regarding the announcement by the CRA, a lag would be created. 
Though, this seems unlikely considering the high efficiency in international financial markets. 
Also rating actions often occur in periods when a company already has high information 
activity. This is typical times of quarterly earnings announcements. Hence, there is often a 
certain degree of contamination at the time of a rating action, but this is impossible to account 
for in a study.   
 
The following two tables summarize the event data we have for negative and positive 
announcements by CRAs. The contaminated events are also listed.  
 
Table 1: Data - Negative Announcements 
Firm Downgrades (cont.) 
Neg. 
Watchlist (cont.)
Neg. 
Outlook (cont.) 
Total Neg. 
Obs. 
(& incl. 
cont.) 
DnB NOR Bank ASA 1  1  0  2 2 
Norsk Hydro ASA 3  1  1  5 5 
Norske Skogindustrier ASA 6 1 5  2  13 14 
Ocean Rig Norway AS 0  3  1  4 4 
Petroleum Geo-Services ASA 4 3 0 1 0  4 8 
SAS AB 2  3  1  6 6 
StatoilHydro ASA 2  0  1  3 3 
Storebrand ASA 1  1  0  2 2 
Telenor ASA 1  1  2  4 4 
Yara International ASA 0 1 1  0  1 2 
Sum: 20 5 16 1 8 0 44 50 
 
                                                 
71 Newsweb is where firms listed on OSE make announcements 
72 Lars Jacob Braarud, Vice President, Listing, Oslo Børs ASA 
73 As mentioned earlier is our study based on the time a rating action is announced on the CRAs website. 
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Table 2: Data - Positive Announcements 
Firm Upgrades (cont.) 
Pos. 
Watchlist (cont.)
Pos. 
Outlook (cont.) 
Total Neg. 
Obs. 
(& incl. 
cont.) 
DnB NOR Bank ASA 5  1  6  12 12 
Norsk Hydro ASA 3  0  1  4 4 
Norske Skogindustrier ASA 0  0  0  0 0 
Ocean Rig Norway AS 2 1 2  0  4 5 
Petroleum Geo-Services ASA 1 1 0  1  2 3 
SAS AB 1  0  0  1 1 
StatoilHydro ASA 4  0  0  4 4 
Storebrand ASA 1  1  0  2 2 
Telenor ASA 0  0  0  0 0 
Yara International ASA 1  0  0  1 1 
Sum: 18 2 4 0 8 0 30 32 
 
We acknowledge that the number of events is limited, especially compared to US studies. Our 
opinion is however that we have enough observations to reach significant results. The rather 
low amount of events in the study is reflected through the total volatility of our samples, so 
when we test for significance by performing t-tests and finding related p-values, the 
uncertainty regarding a relatively small sample is taken into consideration.  
 
Daily historic stock prices for the companies are collected from Datastream. They are 
adjusted for dividends, splits and other factors which can bungle returns. Our benchmark 
index for measuring market returns is the OSEBX (Oslo Stock Exchange Benchmark Index).  
 
We choose to only look at the impact on stock returns, and not the effect for bonds as some 
previous studies. Creighton et al. perform this particular study, but point out the difficulty of 
getting good daily data for bond prices and spreads. Bergh et al. (nr 12/2008) describe the 
bond market in Norway. They find that many of the firms listed on OSE, especially in the oil, 
rig and gas industry, have non-listed bonds where trading is not registered. The price data is 
obtained by the investment banks. Getting and structuralising this data is problematic, or 
virtually impossible. In addition, few of these bond issues trade on a regular basis which 
would force us to use a wider window and by this get less strong results. Hence, we have 
chosen not to focus on the effect on bond pricing of rating changes.   
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6. Results 
 
In the following we present the results of our event study. The study consists of several 
components, referred to as sub-studies (a rating downgrade or a positive watchlist placement 
are examples of two such sub-studies). The sub-studies are also divided into many categories 
where we combine related events. Within these distinct sub-categories we examine different 
event samples on their own (for instance the difference between samples of small and large 
firms). The final detail of our event studies is that we examine different days and periods, 
event slots, within the event window.  
 
Our main focus is the effect of credit rating downgrades and upgrades, with several sub-
categories. We also look at the effect of watch list and outlook announcements. Finally we 
look at the effects of positive or negative announcements aggregated, meaning that all rating, 
watch list and outlook observations are added together and categorized as either negative or 
positive. We do not separate between the CRAs, and hence is the number of events the 
accumulated number from S&P, Moody's and Fitch. 
 
6.1. Rating Changes 
We look at downgrades and upgrades separately. For each of these sub-studies we divide 
related events into sub-categories. As mentioned under section 5, we have removed several 
events that bias our samples. In addition, there are events we are unsure whether to include or 
not, for instance those close to earnings announcements. We test the samples both with and 
without these data. The sample where the uncertain data is included is referred to as including 
contaminated data. Our main focus is however on the uncontaminated sample. As mentioned 
in section 5, the reason for this is that there are some returns in the contaminated sample that 
strongly influence the event study. We suspect stock returns at the time of these rating 
announcements to only partially be caused by rating changes, since the returns are very 
extreme compared to their corresponding modest rating changes. It does not seem economic 
plausible that a rating or watch list action has such immense effect on a stock price. Hence it 
seems more rational that these drastic returns also, or entirely, are related to other information 
brought to the market. The various events we have removed are described in Table A-2 in the 
appendix. The results of the event study including the contaminated data are presented briefly 
in the very end in this result section. 
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6.1.1. Estimation window reflections 
An interesting place to begin describing stock price movement related to rating actions is by 
starting with a broad time perspective. One interesting issue is to identify how the stock price 
moves over the longer time period prior to a rating announcement. We have examined 
individual equity returns deducted for the market index (OSEBX) during the estimation 
window and until the event date, days -120 to 0. This is a simple way (not risk adjusted) of 
observing out- or underperformance. The results are shown in Figure 3.       
 
Figure 3: Cumulative market-adjusted average equity returns prior to rating 
changes 
 
As we see, from the lower blue line in the chart, companies who are subject to downgrades on 
average underperformed the market index in the 120 day period prior to the announcement. 
This underperformance cumulates to approximately 26%. By contrast, companies soon to be 
upgraded do not outperform the broader market correspondingly. The market adjusted return 
for these firms are close to zero for the entire period. Further, Figure 4 illustrates the 
cumulative average abnormal return within the event window. During these days (-20 to 20) 
we observe that the contrast between downgrades and upgrades is not nearly as distinct.  
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Figure 4: Cumulative average abnormal return 
 
Still companies subject to downgrades underperform the market (now risk adjusted 
underperformance), and upgraded firms bounce over and under the zero return line, but the 
results does not seem as significant as for the window of 120 days prior to the event. As 
comparison the downgraded companies underperform with slightly more than 3% during the 
41 days long event window, while during the 120 days pre event date window the same 
underperformance was 26%. Thus, this suggests that the information triggering rating 
downgrades already is reflected in a firm’s stock price. And also indicate that credit rating 
agencies have minor impact on equity holders over the 41 day period. In the following 
sections we will examine in closer detail if this is the entire story, or if credit rating agencies, 
at least under certain circumstances, in fact do influence stock prices.   
 
6.1.2. Downgrades 
Our null hypothesis is that there should be no significant abnormal return related to a rating 
downgrade. Consequently, the alternative hypothesis is that there is significant abnormal 
return related to a downgrade. Intuitively this abnormal return should be negative in the case 
of a negative rating announcement, but still we test for abnormal return in either direction by 
applying a two-sided t-test. Results for rating downgrades are presented in a table for each 
sub-category. Comments are given for further description, in particular extensive when results 
are significant and interesting to elaborate on.  
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6.1.2.1. All events 
Table 3 includes all events related to rating downgrades, and shows the average abnormal 
returns (AARs) and cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) for the different event 
slots we have determined within the event window. It also shows the proportion of events 
with a negative return within the respective periods. 
 
We see that most of the abnormal returns are negative, but that only AAR(0) is of any 
significance. The AAR on the event date is -2,8%, at a 5% significance level. None of the 
other daily abnormal returns in the time span -2 to 2 are close to significant. In fact, AAR(-2) 
and AAR(1) even show a positive return. For the CAAR we observe that period 0 to 2 (-2,3%) 
and -20 to 20 (-3,3%) are the most consistent to an negative impact, but that neither are 
significant.  
   
Based on our results we reject the null hypothesis for AAR(0), the event date. Consequently 
we adopt the alternative hypothesis, which implies that rating downgrades have significant 
negative impact on stock prices. Hence, our first indication that CRAs convey some new 
information to the market is observed. These findings are in line with earlier studies like by 
Hand et al. 
 
Table 3:  
Abnormal Returns related to Downgrades 
Sample: All Events 
    % Negative  
Days Relative to Event AAR  Returns  
-2 1,3 %  0,20 ** 
-1 -0,5 %  0,80 ** 
0 -2,8 % ** 0,65  
1 1,2 %  0,45  
2 -0,8 %  0,60  
      
  CAAR    
0 to 2 -2,3 %  0,65  
-20 to -1 -0,3 %  0,60  
1 to 20 -0,2 %  0,60  
-10 to 10 1,2 %  0,45  
-20 to 20 -3,3 %  0,75 ** 
          
Sample size 20 20   
Std dev daily AAR 0,0123    
Note: ***, **, * indicate significance of 1%, 5% and 10% level, two tailed t-test  
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One can also note from Table 3 that CAAR(-20 to 20) and AAR(-1) have a significant amount 
of negative returns (75% and 80% respectively), which indicates that a downgrade is related 
to a significant amount of more negative than positive returns. In contrast to this AAR(-2) 
actually indicates the opposite, as we find only 20% negative returns at this particular event 
window day. All three observations are at a 5% significance level. One drawback with our test 
of signs is the small event amount (which is extra problematic for binary studies) in the 
sample, so its relevance may be limited due to this issue. 
 
6.1.2.2. Anticipated vs. Unanticipated announcements 
In our study we divide rating downgrades into the sub-category anticipated vs. unanticipated, 
which is in line with the study by Creighton et al. An anticipated change in rating implies that 
the issue or issuer is put on watch list prior to the rating down- or upgrade. An unanticipated 
rating change conversely implies a rating change where the issuer has not been put on watch 
list prior to the rating action. Hence, an unanticipated change in rating should come as a larger 
surprise to the market than an anticipated rating correction. 
Table 4:  
Abnormal Returns related to Downgrades 
Sample: Anticipated vs Unanticipated 
  Anticipated  Unanticipated 
Days Relative to Event AAR  AAR  
-2 1,0 %  1,8 %  
-1 -0,9 %  0,1 %  
0 -1,3 %  -5,0 % ** 
1 1,1 %  1,5 %  
2 -1,0 %  -0,5 %  
      
  CAAR  CAAR  
0 to 2 -1,2 %  -4,0 %  
-20 to -1 -2,1 %  2,4 %  
1 to 20 -3,8 %  5,2 %  
-10 to 10 -0,4 %  3,6 %  
-20 to 20 -7,2 %  2,6 %  
          
Sample size 12 8   
Std dev daily AAR 0,0157  0,0200   
Note: ***, **, * indicate significance of 1%, 5% and 10% level, two tailed t-test  
 
In Table 4 we present the abnormal returns for anticipated and unanticipated downgrades. Our 
results for anticipated changes show that the AARs and CAARs are for the most negative, but 
that none are significant. This lack of significance is consistent with our null hypothesis. 
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Hence, we find that an anticipated rating downgrade does not cause significant negative 
abnormal return.  
 
For unanticipated rating changes the picture is slightly different. For AAR(0) we observe a 
negative abnormal return of -4,98%, which is significant at a 5%-level (p-value: 0,0474). In 
this case we reject the null hypothesis, which implies that an unanticipated announcement of 
change in rating has an impact on a firm’s stock price, and that CRA accordingly convey new 
information to the markets in such cases. For the other event slots the returns are not close to 
significant, whether for the various AARs nor CAARs. The findings are also consistent with 
Creighton et al., although they find significant negative AAR both for day 0 and 1, and for 
CAAR(-20,0). The results also show that our AAR(0) (-4,98%) is quite much larger than their 
result, which was only -1%.   
 
The results appear to make sense since an unanticipated event should have a greater impact 
than an anticipated event, as the former takes the market off guard to a greater extent. In the 
case of an anticipated event, the expected information should be reflected in the market-price 
prior to the actual announcement. In general this is a psychological factor like we see in other 
aspects of the economy. For example unexpected announcements from the Fed, or surprising 
changes in the interest rate from Norges Bank usually have significant impact on financial 
markets. Another interesting feature, though not of any significant confidence level, is that the 
anticipated firms in general do much worse over the entire event window (and the other 
cumulative event slots) than the unanticipated firms. This seems coherent as a poorly 
performing firm is more likely to be put on a watch list in the first place. 
 
6.1.2.3. Small Firms vs. Large Firms 
We test the impact of rating changes both for small and large firms. The reasoning behind 
making this distinction is the suspicion that small firms are more vulnerable to a rating 
downgrade. Relative to large firms they are often less monitored and thus more dependent of 
the signalling effect from a CRA. We divide the firms by their market capitalization. We find 
a clear distinction between the two categorize, where Petroleum Geo-Services is the largest 
firm in the small category, with its 18 billion NOK. DnB NOR and Norsk Hydro are the 
smallest in the large category with roughly 75 billion NOK market capitalization each. A 
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detailed overview over the different firm’s market capitalisation and given category is given 
in Table A-3 in the appendix.   
Table 5: 
Abnormal Returns related to Downgrades 
Sample: Small Firms vs. Large Firms 
  Small Firms  Large Firms   
Days Relative to Event AAR  AAR   
-2 1,7 %  0,5 %   
-1 -0,1 %  -1,2 % * 
0 -4,1 % * -0,3 %   
1 2,0 %  -0,1 %   
2 -1,4 %  0,3 %   
       
  CAAR  CAAR   
0 to 2 -3,5 %  -0,1 %   
-20 to -1 -2,3 %  3,4 %   
1 to 20 -1,7 %  2,5 %   
-10 to 10 0,8 %  1,8 %   
-20 to 20 -8,1 %  5,5 %   
       
Sample size 13 7   
Std dev daily AAR 0,0188 0,0050   
Note: ***, **, * indicate significance of 1%, 5% and 10% level, two tailed t-test  
 
For small firms we find a negative abnormal return of -4,08% for AAR(0) at a 10% 
significance level (p-value: 0,0527). For the other AARs and the CAARs there are no 
significant observations, though the returns are mostly negative as expected. The results for 
large firms give a slightly different result. In this category we observe a negative abnormal 
return of -1,25% for AAR(-1) also at a 10% significance level (p-value: 0,0537). Hence we 
should be able to reject the null hypothesis of no impact for both small and large firms at 
these respective days.  
 
Though, we do find it hard to find sound economic logic behind the AAR(-1) result for large 
firms. Previous studies by of Creighton et al. only find significant abnormal returns related to 
the sample of small firms. The returns they find are smaller than ours, but still significant due 
to lower volatility. 
 
The reason for large firms having significant negative abnormal returns on the day prior to 
announcement, while small firms on the other hand are affected at the day of announcement is 
difficult to explain. One possibility could be that bad news travel faster for large firms than 
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for small firms. This argument can be backed by the heavier monitoring of larger firms. Still, 
this should be a weak argument if we assume that markets are efficient. Whether this last 
assumption is true or not has been heavily debated since the early morning of financial 
markets, and is probably not going to be concluded any time soon. Hence, we will have to 
settle with the conclusion that according to our observations markets are a bit more efficient 
for large firms.   
 
Our observation that smaller firms experience the largest negative return may be explained by 
the fact that small firms are more volatile compared to large firms (0,0188 vs. 0,0050). The 
increased volatility is caused by large firms often having strong and stable market positions 
and steady cash flows, so that negative announcements don’t create such a large reaction in 
the market as for smaller and more vulnerable firms. The higher volatility is also caused by 
the earlier mentioned lower degree of monitoring and can make negative news, like 
downgrades, resulting in a greater impact for smaller firms. This could be interpreted 
analogous with the discussion of anticipated vs. unanticipated events, in a way that 
unanticipated events are more unanticipated for smaller firms, and hence have a larger impact, 
due to less monitoring. Though by saying so, one implicitly suggests that the market 
efficiency is higher for large than for small firms, which is a topic suitable for an entire thesis 
itself and we will hence not go further into here. 
 
6.1.2.4. Downgrades of 1 Notch vs. Several Notches 
In this sub-category we have differentiated between small and big downgrades, small being 
when a firm’s rating drops with one notch74, and big being when it drops with more than one 
notch. Intuitively this distinction should matter, and show a higher negative abnormal return 
for the several notches than for the single notch downgrade. 
 
As Table 6 on the next page indicates, our intuition is on to something, but the results are not 
exactly what we expected. For AAR(0) we find a negative abnormal return of -1,6% and -
5,4% respectively for the one notch and several notch sub-categories. However, only the 
result for the first category is significant (1% level), due to different volatility. For 
downgrades of more than one notch we find no significant results at all.  
 
                                                 
74 For example from Aaa to Aa1 
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Table 6: 
Abnormal Returns related to Downgrades 
Sample: 1 notch vs Several notches 
  1 Notch  Several Notches   
Days Relative to Event AAR  AAR   
-2 1,1 % * 1,8 %   
-1 0,1 %  -2,0 %   
0 -1,6 % *** -5,4 %   
1 0,3 %  3,4 %   
2 -0,1 %  -2,5 %   
       
  CAAR  CAAR   
0 to 2 -1,3 %  -4,6 %   
-20 to -1 1,5 %  -4,5 %   
1 to 20 -2,6 %  5,3 %   
-10 to 10 -0,6 %  5,4 %   
-20 to 20 -2,7 %  -4,6 %   
          
Sample size 14 6   
Std dev daily AAR 0,0053 0,0393   
Note: ***, **, * indicate significance of 1%, 5% and 10% level, two tailed t-test  
 
The results may seem surprising since one would maybe expect both more severe negative 
abnormal returns and more significant results associated with big downgrades. One possible 
explanation for our results not entirely being in line with these expectations could be the fact 
that we do not separate between notches downgraded within investment grade from notches 
downgraded within speculative grade. This may impact results due to the nonlinear 
relationship between default rates and rating classes. There is for instance a larger increase in 
default probability associated to one notch downgrade within speculative grade vs. a notch 
change within investment grade. This issue does nevertheless not seem to be a problem in this 
sub-category. The big downgrades seem overall to be related to larger negative abnormal 
returns, and is thus as expected.  
 
The reason for the non-significant results for the big downgrade category is related to 
volatility. Firms that are downgraded more than one notch are usually in more severe financial 
trouble, and therefore tend to be more volatile regarding stock returns. We observe a volatility 
on stock returns of 0,0053 for the simple notch downgrades, while the volatility for the 
multiple notch firms is as high as 0,0393. The tendency of higher abnormal returns in the 
second category is also an indication of this matter. Due to this higher volatility (and a relative 
small sample) a significant result demands a very high observation of negative abnormal 
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return. Even the quite considerable negative abnormal return of -5,4% is not enough to create 
a significant result. The result would most likely increase in statistical strength if the sample 
size could be increased, though we can not say this for sure. 
 
6.1.2.5. Changes within Investment Grade vs. Speculative Grade 
In this sub-category we test for abnormal returns related to downgrades within the investment 
grade and speculative grade categories. In accordance with the mentioned nonlinear 
relationship between default rates and rating classes, our suspicion suggests that some 
significant negative abnormal returns will be found, and that these most likely will be larger 
for the speculative grade. 
Table 7: 
Abnormal Returns related to Downgrades 
Sample: Within Investment Grade vs. Within Speculative Grade 
  Investment  Speculative   
Days Relative to Event AAR  AAR   
-2 0,4 %  2,5 %   
-1 -1,0 % * -0,3 %   
0 -0,4 %  -5,7 % * 
1 0,1 %  3,1 %   
2 0,0 %  -1,9 %   
       
  CAAR  CAAR   
0 to 2 -0,3 %  -4,4 %   
-20 to -1 2,3 %  -1,8 %   
1 to 20 0,7 %  1,2 %   
-10 to 10 0,5 %  4,2 %   
-20 to 20 2,6 %  -6,4 %   
          
Sample size 9 9   
Std dev daily AAR 0,0048 0,0269   
Note: ***, **, * indicate significance of 1%, 5% and 10% level, two tailed t-test  
 
Table 7 justifies to some extent this suspicion. For AAR(-1) in the within investment grade 
category we have a negative abnormal return of -1% at a 10% significance level (p-value: 
0,0664). No other results in this category are significant. In the within speculative category we 
observe a negative abnormal return of -5,7% at a 10% significance level (p-value: 0,0718) for 
the event day, AAR(0). It also appears to be a clear pattern that negative abnormal returns 
within speculative grade are larger than the corresponding figures for investment grade.  
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In light of the non linear relationship between a decrease in credit rating and increase in 
default probability, and the suggestion that this disfavours speculative graded firms, the 
results appear to makes sense. Furthermore we observe that the volatility is much higher for 
speculative grade (0,0269) than for investment grade (0,0048), this also being in line with our 
comments on the one or several notches sub-category. If it had not been for the higher 
volatility the speculative firms would have higher statistical power related to their large 
negative abnormal return.    
 
6.1.2.6. From Investment to Speculative Grade vs. Within Investment / 
Speculative Grade 
We also here make a distinction between investment and speculative grade, but focus on the 
shift from one category to the other. Hence we define the first category as issues or issuers 
being downgraded from investment to speculative grade, and the second category as issues or 
issuers being downgraded within either investment or speculative grade. As the distinction 
between investment and speculative grade is often perceived as quite substantial in investors’ 
eyes, we expect to find larger negative abnormal returns for the first category.  
Table 8: 
Abnormal Returns related to Downgrades 
Sample: From Inv. To Spec. Grade vs Within Inv./Spec. Grade 
  Inv->Spec  Within Inv/Spec   
Days Relative to Event AAR  AAR   
-2 -0,3 %  1,5 %   
-1 1,0 %  -0,7 %   
0 -0,2 %  -3,1 % ** 
1 -2,2 %  1,6 %   
2 0,4 %  -0,9 %   
       
  CAAR  CAAR   
0 to 2 -2,0 %  -2,4 %   
-20 to -1 -5,2 %  0,2 %   
1 to 20 -10,8 %  1,0 %   
-10 to 10 -9,5 %  2,4 %   
-20 to 20 -16,1 %  -1,9 %   
          
Sample size 2 18   
Std dev daily AAR 0,0110 0,0137   
Note: ***, **, * indicate significance of 1%, 5% and 10% level, two tailed t-test  
 
As presented in Table 8 our results are not all in line with our initial expectations. The daily 
abnormal returns, AARs, for the inter-grade category are both smaller and less significant 
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than what the case is for the residual category. This observation is fully in contrast with our 
intuition. There are no significant daily negative returns at all for the first category. Moving 
on to the cumulative results, we note that they are more in line with our opening expectations. 
Though still not showing sign of significance under the 10%-level, they are consistent 
negative over the different event slots, and also show quite considerable negative returns. This 
indicates that a downgrade from investment to speculative grade is related to a cumulative 
negative reaction on stock price. Even so, the fact is that our study shows no significant 
results for the inter-grade category. Hence we can not reject our null hypothesis.  
 
One should expect a firm to be affected negatively by such a substantial rating downgrade. As 
mentioned the gap between these two main credit-worthiness classes seem important for 
investors. In addition, there are regulatory matters like rating triggers that reinforce the 
negative effect of a downgrade from investment to speculative grade. For instance, many 
pension funds have rating triggers, and thus are forced to sell a bond when it falls underneath 
investment grade. This will again affect the stock price of the issuer due to higher financing 
cost. Rating triggers are not as widespread for Norwegian investors as they are in the U.S. 
This implies that one could expect an inter-grade downgrade to have less effect on stock 
returns on the Norwegian stock exchange (OSE)75.  
 
Another reason for expecting the impact to be large and significant is the previously stated 
nonlinear relationship between ratings and default probabilities. More precisely the difference 
in terms of creditworthiness between the different classes is bigger at the lower end of the 
rating scale. Hence one should expect downgrades from investment to junk to be associated 
with larger negative abnormal returns than the considerable amount of within investment 
grade downgrades that is included in the other category. Hence our results also here diverge 
from economic intuition.   
 
The mismatch between economical expectations and our results for the inter-grade category 
has its explanation in the very limited sample. For this subcategory we have only 2 events. 
This makes it (almost) impossible to produce any realistic and significant results from this 
category. It is in fact theoretically impossible to conduct an event study on the sample since 
we have the same amount of estimators as events, and the degree of freedom thus is zero. We 
                                                 
75 This is not necessarily straightforward as a Norwegian stock might have an U.S. owner. However, the Home-
Equity-Puzzle suggest that there are a high ratio of Norwegian investors in their home market.  
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have manipulated the degrees of freedom to be one when calculating our results. We wished 
by this to get a vague indication of how this category reacted to a downgrade, knowing 
preliminary that it does not bear statistical power. Hence, we can not draw any conclusions on 
this category from our study. 
 
As a supplement to studying the effects of downgrades crossing from investment to 
speculative grade, we also examine the residual sample (downgrades that happen within 
investment or speculative grade) for significant abnormal returns. For this sample we discover 
a negative abnormal return of -3,1% at announcement date at a 5% significance level (p-
value: 0,0397). This result in itself is not surprising, as it is based on almost the exact same 
sample as the all events category76, and also seems economical plausible. The interesting 
thing though is that one would suspect that if downgrades within the grades cause significant 
negative abnormal returns, then a downgrade crossing grades would cause at least results of 
equal magnitude. When our results show that this is not the observed relationship between 
these categories in our statistical study, we again point to the fact that the small sample for the 
first category makes it very hard to extract any significant results. 
 
6.1.2.7. Downgrade & put on Negative Watch List @ same time 
We have some observations of CRAs that at the same time both downgrade a firm’s rating 
and put the firm on a further negative watch list. This should be perceived by the market as an 
extra negative announcement. In this section we sample these events and examine for 
negative abnormal returns for this sub-category.  
 
As shown in Table 9 in the left column our study points out that this double announcement is 
related to negative abnormal returns. For AAR(0) returns are -5,7% and for CAAR(0,2) they 
are -7,8%, significance level being at 5% and 10% respectively. As comparison we have 
disclosed the previously presented results for the sub-category “All Events”. And as we notice 
the impact is larger for a downgrade combined with a negative watch list placement. To our 
knowledge this has not been tested in previous studies, but it seems like an economic rational 
result. 
 
 
                                                 
76 Sample size: ”All events sample (20 events)” – ”From investment to speculative sample (2events)”= 18 events    
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Table 9: 
Abnormal Returns related to Downgrades 
Sample: Downgrade & Put on Negative Watch List @ same time 
  Down+Watch  All events   
Days Relative to Event AAR  AAR   
-2 2,6 %  1,3 %   
-1 -1,1 %  -0,5 %   
0 -5,7 % ** -2,8 %  ** 
1 -0,6 %  1,2 %   
2 -1,6 %  -0,8 %   
       
  CAAR  CAAR   
0 to 2 -7,8 % * -2,3 %   
-20 to -1 6,1 %  -0,3 %   
1 to 20 0,9 %  -0,2 %   
-10 to 10 -6,1 %  1,2 %   
-20 to 20 1,3 %  -3,3 %   
          
Sample size 3  20   
Std dev daily AAR 0,0121  0,0123   
Note: ***, **, * indicate significance of 1%, 5% and 10% level, two tailed t-test  
 
These observations are not surprising. As we found that a downgrade is followed by 
significant negative abnormal returns, one should assume that a downgrade followed by a 
negative watch should cause even larger negative abnormal returns. CRAs state the possibility 
of severe creditworthiness issues by both downgrading the credit rating and putting the firm 
on a negative watch list for possible further downgrades in the future. The additional 
significant finding for CAAR(0,2) is due to the very high abnormal return on the 
announcement day, and the relatively low volatility of the sub-category (compared to other 
sub-categories with high abnormal returns that we have examined). This is also an indication 
of extra market awareness for this sub-category.  
 
6.1.3. Upgrades 
Now we move on to the next matter in our study, which is if and how a rating upgrade affects 
stock return. Our null hypothesis is the same, that a positive rating action should not be 
related to significant abnormal returns for a firm’s stock. As for downgrades we also here 
distinguish between contaminated and non-contaminated events, with focus on the latter. Our 
results for non-contaminated upgrades are in detail presented in table 4.4. The results are in 
general not showing any significant relation between an upgrade and abnormal return. Hence 
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we present all samples in this table. Some supplementary comments are given for further 
description of the sub-categories where we find it useful to elaborate.  
Table 10: 
Abnormal Returns related to Upgrades 
Sample: All Samples 
  % Negative  All Events Anticipated Unanticipated  Small Large 
Days Relative to Event Returns  AAR AAR AAR  AAR AAR 
-2 38,9 %  -0,2 % 1,3 % -0,5 %  -0,3 % 0,2 % 
-1 66,7 %  -0,2 % -0,6 % -0,1 %  -0,3 % 0,2 % 
0 44,4 %  0,2 % 0,0 % 0,2 %  -0,4 % 1,7 % 
1 66,7 %  -0,3 % -0,3 % -0,3 %  0,0 % -1,2 % 
2 61,1 %  -0,2 % 0,3 % -0,3 %  -0,4 % 0,1 % 
          
    CAAR CAAR CAAR  CAAR CAAR
0 to 2 66,7 %  -0,3 % 0,0 % -0,4 %  -0,7 % 0,6 % 
-20 to -1 66,7 %  -0,4 % 5,1 % -1,5 %  0,2 % -2,2 % 
1 to 20 61,1 %  0,4 % 4,6 % -0,4 %  0,2 % 1,1 % 
-10 to 10 50,0 %  -0,9 % 5,1 % -2,1 %  -1,0 % -0,7 % 
-20 to 20 55,6 %  0,2 % 9,7 % -1,7 %  0,1 % 0,5 % 
                      
Sample size 18  18 3 15  13 5  
Std dev daily AAR   0,0034  0,0076  0,0038   0,0035  0,0082  
Note: ***, **, * indicate significance of 1%, 5% and 10% level, two tailed t-test   
 
As we see from Table 10 there are no significant results within any event slots suggesting 
abnormal returns, whether negative or positive, related to rating upgrades. This does not only 
apply for the main category “All Events”, but also all the other sub-categories. In short this 
implies that we in the case of upgrades keep our null hypothesis, that CRAs don’t convey any 
new information to financial markets causing abnormal returns. The results are consistent 
with most previous literature which finds weak or no significant abnormal return as a result of 
upgrades. Hand et al find like us no significant impact, while Creighton et al find a small 
abnormal return.  
 
We also observe that none of the results from our analysis on proportion of negative returns 
are significant. Moreover, we observe only two event slots where there is majority of positive 
returns, day -2 (61,1%) and the actual event day (56,6%). All the others have more negative 
returns than positive, which obviously is against expectations. However, as long as no results 
are significant there are no final conclusions to make in this matter.  
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The most likely explanation for these non-significant results is the tendency towards that good 
news travels faster than bad news. The rationale behind this is that firms have a greater 
incentive of publishing good news as fast as possible, contra bad news which could be 
beneficial to wait to publish as long as possible. Hence it may very well be that the good news 
causing an upgrade is already published and reflected in the stock price at the time when the 
upgrade is announced. 
 
6.2. Watch list 
We also want to examine the effects of a watch list placement by the CRAs. This sub-study is 
not expected to reveal as large and significant results as the case for rating changes. Our null 
hypothesis for watch list events is the same as for previous sub-studies, that no significant 
abnormal return is related to when a CRA’s announces that a firm is put on watch list. We test 
this for both negative and positive watch list announcements, but choose to only focus on one 
subcategory, the “All Events”-sample. Also, most of the previously applied categories are not 
possible to use on watch list events.  
 
6.2.1. Negative watch list 
Table 11: 
Abnormal Returns related to Neg. Watch list 
Sample: All Events 
    % Negative   
Days Relative to Event AAR  Returns   
-2 0,7 %  0,44   
-1 -0,2 %  0,63   
0 -2,1 % *** 0,63   
1 0,7 %  0,50   
2 -0,1 %  0,44   
       
  CAAR     
0 to 2 -1,5 %  0,50   
-20 to -1 -5,9 % ** 0,63   
1 to 20 3,3 %  0,44   
-10 to 10 -2,4 %  0,50   
-20 to 20 -4,7 %  0,63   
          
Sample size 16     
Std dev daily AAR 0,0058     
Note: ***, **, * indicate significance of 1%, 5% and 10% level, two tailed t-test  
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Table 11 disclose our results for firms put on negative watch list. The results are close to 
expected, with abnormal return on the event day being largest and most significant. For 
AAR(0) we note a negative abnormal return of –2,1% at a 1% significance level (p-value: 
0,0026). The study also indicate a significant (5% level) cumulative abnormal return of -5,9% 
for CAAR(-20,-1). Thus, we can reject our null hypothesis for these event slots, and conclude 
that a negative watch list announcement has a negative impact on stock return in these given 
periods. The results of proportion negative returns do not show any significance. 
  
The results are consistent with the results from most previous studies, like for instance Hand 
et al, which also find significant negative abnormal return when a firm is placed on negative 
watch. Barron et al. on the other hand do not find significant abnormal returns. The rationale 
behind the findings seems obvious, as a negative view of a firm’s creditworthiness on a 
medium term horizon stated by a CRA, should have an adverse impact on the stock price.  
 
An interesting feature in this sub-study is that the negative abnormal return at AAR(0) for 
watch list announcements is only slightly lower than what is the case for rating downgrades (-
2,1% vs. -2,8%). And that the negative abnormal return actually is more significant for the 
watch list related (p-value: 0,0026 vs. 0,0375: due to lower volatility). One would perhaps 
believe that an actual downgrade would give a substantially larger negative and significant 
result than what would be the case for a negative watch list announcement. This not being the 
case indicates that watch list announcements are almost as influential on stock prices as actual 
rating movements. As mentioned, the cause of higher statistical power is owed to the lower 
volatility of the watch list sample. Without going too much into detail around why, we want 
to point out that this is probably to be expected for a watch list sample, as we believe that high 
volatility often is correlated with types of factors that lead to a credit rating downgrade rather 
than a watch list placement. Consequently this can be viewed as one explanatory factor for the 
higher significance.         
 
We observe from the table that substantial and significant negative abnormal returns are 
observed prior to the event, and that the latter part of the event window has a positive 
abnormal return (though not statistically significant). This might indicate that a watch list 
announcement is largely reflected in the stock price prior to the event date, and that whatever 
value left in the watch list announcement is quickly absorbed by the market on the event date. 
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6.2.2 Positive watch list 
Table 12: 
Abnormal Returns related to Pos. Watch list 
Sample: All Events 
    % Negative   
Days Relative to Event AAR  Returns   
-2 0,2 %  0,50   
-1 0,9 %  0,25   
0 -1,3 %  1,00   
1 0,4 %  0,50   
2 -0,4 %  0,75   
       
  CAAR     
0 to 2 -1,3 %  1,00   
-20 to -1 3,4 %  0,25   
1 to 20 -2,7 %  0,50   
-10 to 10 3,5 %  0,25   
-20 to 20 -0,6 %  0,50   
          
Sample size 4     
Std dev daily AAR 0,0088     
Note: ***, **, * indicate significance of 1%, 5% and 10% level, two tailed t-test  
 
For positive watch list placements we find no significant positive abnormal returns, neither 
for AARs nor for CAARs.  From Table 12 we also observe that there are no tendencies of 
results being strictly positive either, as we see five event slots with negative return. However, 
the weakness with this sample is obviously the low amount of events (only 4). Our results are 
still consistent with several other studies that also find no significant positive effect on stock 
return by positive watch list placements. Barron et al find positive returns, but their sample 
size (2) is very small. Hence we do not reject our null hypothesis for positive watch list 
announcements. As for upgrades, one can perhaps explain the result, and the divergence from 
the results related to the negative announcements, with the tendency of good news travelling 
faster than bad news. 
 
6.3. Outlook 
CRAs have a third type of announcement, by putting an issue or an issuer on an outlook list. 
This is an indication by the CRA that the rating might be up for an evaluation within a 
medium time horizon. Our null hypothesis for an outlook placement is the same as for earlier 
sub-studies, there should be no significant abnormal returns related to outlook 
announcements. We test this for both negative and positive announcements. Equivalent as for 
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the “Watch List”-study, we have only focused on the “All Events”-sample here, and due to 
modest expectations of significant results we have also chosen to combine both positive and 
negative announcement in one table.  
Table 13: 
Abnormal Returns related to Pos. or Neg. Outlook 
Sample: All Events 
  Positive  % Negative  Negative  % Negative  
Days Relative to Event AAR  Returns  AAR  Returns  
-2 -0,2 %  0,57  -0,7 %  0,75  
-1 0,1 %  0,57  -1,0 %  0,75  
0 0,3 %  0,29  -1,7 %  0,75  
1 -0,2 %  0,57  -0,2 %  0,50  
2 0,3 %  0,29  0,8 %  0,50  
          
  CAAR    CAAR    
0 to 2 0,3 %  0,43  -1,1 %  0,63  
-20 to -1 0,8 %  0,43  3,6 %  0,25  
1 to 20 -2,8 %  0,71  -2,7 %  0,50  
-10 to 10 -1,2 %  0,57  -0,4 %  0,63  
-20 to 20 -1,8 %  0,43  -0,8 %  0,50  
                
Sample size 7 7 8  8  
Std dev daily AAR 0,0061    0,0094     
Note: ***, **, * indicate significance of 1%, 5% and 10% level, two tailed t-test  
  
Our assumption that outlook announcements have a weak impact on stock returns is 
confirmed in Table 13. Neither positive nor negative outlook actions give significant results. 
Similar to what the previous presented sub-studies also have shown, it seems that a negative 
announcement is more consistent with a negative stock reaction, as the great majority of event 
slots in the event window confirms just this. For positive outlook announcements the results 
are however more volatile, and might as well be negative as the expected positive. It needs to 
be said that the samples for both categories are small in this sub-study. And it would probably 
reveal more reliable and interesting results if this amount would have been higher. For 
instance is AAR(0) for negative announcements (-1,7%) not far from being significant at a 
10% level (p-value: 0,1183).   
 
6.4. Aggregated rating announcements 
As mentioned earlier, the most challenging part about testing the effect of rating changes for 
firms listed on the OSE is the limited size of the samples. Thus, to increase the size in this 
sub-study we have chosen to combine events from rating, watch list and outlook 
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announcements, as opposed to looking at these categories isolated the way we have done until 
now. We have called the two categories for Aggregated Negative Announcements and 
Aggregated Positive Announcements. A negative announcement is a rating downgrade, 
negative watch list placement or a negative outlook, and a positive announcement is 
consequently a rating upgrade, positive watch list placement or a positive outlook. The 
intention of combining events in such a way is to reach a higher number of events for each 
category, and by that hopefully increase the statistical power of our event study.  
 
Still, we do acknowledge that there are weaknesses of such an approach. By pooling rating 
changes, watch list placements and outlooks in the same category we implicitly say that a 
change in one of the categories is equivalent and comparable with a change in the other two 
categories. Conversely our results so far show that this is not the case. For instance seems a 
rating downgrade to be a stronger signal of declining creditworthiness than a negative outlook 
is. Nevertheless, combining all negative announcements in one study and all positive 
announcements in another study may give us some additional answers, or at least increase the 
significance of results we already have disclosed. This type of announcement grouping has 
also been done on Australian equities in lack of a large sample size, by Creighton et al. 
 
6.4.1. Aggregated Negative Announcements 
We have studied the effects of aggregated negative announcements for the sub-categories “All 
Events” and for “Small Firms vs. Large Firms”. Our null hypothesis is as earlier, no impact on 
stock returns from rating announcements. Results are presented in tables, with further 
comments and discussions of interesting findings. 
 
6.4.1.1. All events 
We notice from Table 14 that the increased sample size (44 events) has reduced the sample’s 
volatility substantially. This affects significance levels in a positive manner, and leads to a 
statistical strong result for AAR(0). On the event day we observe a negative abnormal return 
of -2,3% at a 1% significance level. The p-value at this day is only 0,0005, which is a huge 
statistical improvement from AAR(0)/All Events/Downgrade in Table 3 which had a p-value 
of 0,0375. Though still not presented as a significant result in the table, CAAR(0,2) is now 
very close with a p-value of 0,1030. 
 
67 
 
Table 14: 
ARs related to Downgrade, Neg. Watchlist & Outlook
Sample: All Events 
    % Negative   
Days Relative to Event AAR  Returns   
-2 0,7 %  0,39   
-1 -0,5 %  0,73 *** 
0 -2,3 % *** 0,66 ** 
1 0,8 %  0,48   
2 -0,3 %  0,52   
       
  CAAR     
0 to 2 -1,8 %  0,59   
-20 to -1 -1,6 %  0,55   
1 to 20 0,6 %  0,52   
-10 to 10 -0,4 %  0,50   
-20 to 20 -3,4 %  0,66 ** 
          
Sample size 44     
Std dev daily AAR 0,0062     
Note: ***, **, * indicate significance of 1%, 5% and 10% level, two tailed t-test  
 
 
The strong significance of AAR(0) leads us to reject our null hypothesis for negative 
announcements. Our results clearly indicate that negative announcements on creditworthiness 
are related to negative abnormal return at the event day. The borderline significant 
CAAR(0,2) puts at least doubt over the null hypothesis. Our suspicion is that increasing the 
sample additionally would lead to a result within 10% significance level for this event slot. In 
total it seems that pooling all negative announcements lead to higher statistical significance 
than in the case of only downgrades. It is in other words a more reliable event study. This is 
explained by the lower volatility. At the same time, the negative abnormal returns for the 
“aggregated negative announcements”-sample seem smaller for than for the strictly 
“downgrade”-sample. This does also make sense, as a downgrade is more drastic than the two 
other rating announcements, and hence should lead to a larger drop in stock price. Our results 
are consistent with the study by Creighton et al.  
 
Due to the larger sample we also observe more statistical significant results from the test on 
proportion of negative returns. Here we notice that AAR(-1), AAR(0) and CAAR(-20,20) all 
contain a significant percentage of events with negative returns. And by this indicating that it 
is not only some heavy negative outliers who bias our results and create the negative 
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abnormal return. Thus, our suspicion that negative announcements lead to negative abnormal 
returns is being supported by this test.        
 
6.4.1.2. Small Firms vs. Large Firms 
As for some of the previous sub-studies we wish to separate small and large firms to check for 
significant results within these categories. Our suspicion is that announcements from CRAs 
have stronger impact and are more significant for small than for large firms.   
Table 15: 
ARs related to Downgrade, Neg. Watchlist & Outlook
Sample: Small Firms vs Large Firms 
  Small  Large   
Days Relative to Event AAR   AAR   
-2 1,1 %  0,0 %   
-1 -0,5 %  -0,5 %   
0 -3,5 % *** -0,1 %   
1 1,7 % * -0,9 % ** 
2 -0,7 %  0,6 %   
       
  CAAR  CAAR   
0 to 2 -2,5 %  -0,4 %   
-20 to -1 -4,2 %  3,3 % * 
1 to 20 0,6 %  0,7 %   
-10 to 10 -1,3 %  1,4 %   
-20 to 20 -7,1 %  3,9 %   
          
Sample size 29 15   
Std dev daily AAR 0,0093  0,0035   
Note: ***, **, * indicate significance of 1%, 5% and 10% level, two tailed t-test  
 
Table 15 presents our results for these two sub-categories. We note that the left column shows 
a highly significant abnormal return at the event day of -3,5%. This abnormal return is well 
within a 1% significance level (p-value: 0,0008). More surprisingly the study also presents a 
positive abnormal return of 1,7% the day after the event at a 10% significance level. This 
finding is not in line with our expectations, but may be a correction for a systematic negative 
overreaction on the event day itself.  
 
Furthermore the sample of large firms also provides some unexpected results. We observe 
that AAR(1) is a negative abnormal return of -0,9% at a 5% significance level. Detecting a 
negative abnormal return after the event day in this sample is not in line with Table 5 which 
showed that large firms have a significant negative abnormal return the day prior to the event 
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for downgrades. The other unanticipated result from this sample is the significant positive 
abnormal return found in the event slot -20 to -1. This abnormal return of 3,3% is well within 
a 10% significance level (p-value: 0,0566). Additionally we observe that CAAR(-20,20) has a 
positive abnormal return of 3,9%, and is close to a 10% significance level (p-value: 0,1058). 
These results are hard to explain with economic plausibility. Ceteris paribus, a negative 
announcement from a CRA should not lead to a positive abnormal stock return, and the shift 
in significance from day -1 to day 1 is also difficult to explain. Mathematically it implies that 
large firms have a strong negative abnormal return related to negative watch list and outlook 
announcements on the day after the announcement. In sum, these factors add up to a mixture 
that is hard to explain. Thus, we do not wish to draw any conclusions, but rather state that it 
seems like large firms can be impacted (significantly) both negatively and positively by a 
rating related negative announcement. It also leads to a suspicion that a CRA’s opinion is less 
important for large firms than what is the case for smaller firms.             
 
6.4.2. Total Positive Announcements 
Positive announcements have thus far proved to be of less significance than negative ones. 
Hence we choose to present our results from this sub-study more briefly and in one table. Our 
null hypothesis stays the same, there should be no abnormal returns related to positive 
announcements from the CRAs.  
Table 16: 
ARs related to Upgrade, Pos. Watch list & Outlook 
Sample: All Samples 
  % Negative All Events Small  Large 
Days Relative to Event Returns AAR AAR  AAR 
-2 0,45 -0,1 % 0,1 %  -0,2 % 
-1 0,59 0,0 % 0,4 %  -0,2 % 
0 0,48 0,0 % 0,5 %  -0,2 % 
1 0,62 -0,2 % -0,4 %  -0,1 % 
2 0,55 -0,1 % -0,2 %  -0,1 % 
       
   CAAR CAAR  CAAR 
0 to 2 0,66 -0,3 % 0,0 %  -0,4 % 
-20 to -1 0,55 0,4 % -0,9 %  1,0 % 
1 to 20 0,62 -0,8 % -0,2 %  -1,0 % 
-10 to 10 0,48 -0,4 % -0,1 %  -0,5 % 
-20 to 20 0,52 -0,4 % -0,7 %  -0,3 % 
               
Sample size 29 29 9  20  
Std dev daily AAR 0,0029 0,0060   0,0031  
Note: ***, **, * indicate significance of 1%, 5% and 10% level, two tailed t-test   
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Table 16 confirms our experience so far of positive announcements not being related to any 
significant abnormal returns at all. This is also consistent after increasing our sample up to 29 
events. It also verifies that an expectation of positive announcements being related to positive 
abnormal returns does not hold. In fact there are more negative abnormal returns than positive 
ones within the three samples.     
 
6.5. Including Contaminated Data 
We will in the following present the results of our event studies including the contaminated 
data. For this section we will only present some of the sub-studies we previously have 
presented, and refer interested readers to the appendix for all our conducted studies with these 
data. Hence, we will not go into the same depth with this study as we did with the non-
contaminated study. Contaminated data is not what we focus on in this paper, though we find 
it useful for the reader to see some of the results, and in particular how they may differ from 
the non-contaminated data-set. In the following we present our results for downgrades and 
upgrades.  
 
6.5.1. Downgrades 
For this sub-category we add five extra events to the initial sample when we conduct our new 
contaminated study. These five events were eliminated from the original sample because of 
other value impacting events within the event window, and might thus bias the effect of the 
rating announcement. For a more detailed description of these events see the appendix, Table 
A-2.   
 
As we note from Table 17 the five extra events does not alter the results from the non-
contaminated study very much. AAR(0) is still significantly negative, but now to a greater 
and more significant extent (-8,0% vs. -2,8%, and 5% significance level vs. 1% level). Also 
CAAR(0,2) has become significant at a 1% significance level, which is a quite drastic change 
from being insignificant with only non-contaminated data. The general observation is that 
almost all abnormal returns are increased in magnitude. This is not surprising as the new 
events both have a downgrade element and a contaminating element (i.g. a negative earnings 
announcement) imbedded. It seems economic plausible that the latter element would further 
strengthen the effect of the downgrade.  
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Table 17: 
Abnormal Returns related to Downgrades 
Sample: All Events (Incl. Contaminated Data) 
  Contaminated  Non-Contaminated   
Days Relative to Event AAR  AAR   
-2 0,8 %  1,3 %   
-1 0,4 %  -0,5 %   
0 -8,0 % *** -2,8 % ** 
1 0,8 %  1,2 %   
2 -1,5 %  -0,8 %   
       
  CAAR  CAAR   
0 to 2 -8,6 % *** -2,3 %   
-20 to -1 3,3 %  -0,3 %   
1 to 20 2,0 %  -0,2 %   
-10 to 10 -4,2 %  1,2 %   
-20 to 20 -2,7 %  -3,3 %   
          
Sample size 25 20   
Std dev daily AAR 0,0119 0,0123   
Note: ***, **, * indicate significance of 1%, 5% and 10% level, two tailed t-test  
 
6.5.2. Upgrades 
Regarding rating upgrades we initially excluded two contaminated events that might bias 
abnormal returns related to this action. In general, our study has shown us that positive 
announcements from CRAs do not tend to impact stock return significantly. Thus, we do not 
expect to see drastic changes when we include the contaminated events to the sample.    
 
Table 18 does not alter this view on positive announcements. Even with the contaminated data 
included we do not get any significant results. The only tendency, at least for the CAARs, is 
that the abnormal returns seem inflated in magnitude. This is in line with our findings on the 
contaminated downgrade sample. The seemingly irrational feature regarding the results in the 
table is that they are almost all negative, which is not intuitive when we examine positive 
rating announcements. Still, as long as none of these results are close to significant we do not 
draw any conclusions in this matter, but point out the potential anomaly.      
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Table 18: 
Abnormal Returns related to Upgrades 
Sample: All Events (Incl. Contaminated Data) 
  Contaminated  Non-Contaminated   
Days Relative to Event AAR  AAR   
-2 -0,4 %  -0,2 %   
-1 -0,1 %  -0,2 %   
0 0,2 %  0,2 %   
1 -0,3 %  -0,3 %   
2 -0,2 %  -0,2 %   
       
  CAAR  CAAR   
0 to 2 -0,3 %  -0,3 %   
-20 to -1 -2,2 %  -0,4 %   
1 to 20 -1,6 %  0,4 %   
-10 to 10 -1,8 %  -0,9 %   
-20 to 20 -3,7 %  0,2 %   
          
Sample size 20 18   
Std dev daily AAR 0,0044 0,0034   
Note: ***, **, * indicate significance of 1%, 5% and 10% level, two tailed t-test  
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7. Future work 
 
During the work with this paper we found, both by reading other studies and through our own 
work, several topics that could be interesting for future work regarding the role of CRAs. We 
also acknowledge factors that can improve a similar study as the one we have conducted.    
 
As pointed out earlier, a potential area of improvement would be having more observations on 
Norwegian firms. If OSE’s demand for ratings increases in the future, additional aspects of 
bond ratings can be examined and with better precision. With more observations one could 
test the difference between long and short term paper ratings, as Barron et al. As done by the 
same paper, one could also look at the volatility and cost of capital. Dependent on easily 
accessed and accurate data for bond prices one could test the effect rating changes have on 
these prices for firms listed on the OSE.  
 
We have also thought of studies that can be conducted as of today, and which are not limited 
to data from OSE. One interesting subject would be to examine market and investor 
preferences between the different CRAs. Although investors state77 that they combine the 
opinions of several CRAs when analyzing a firm, it might be that one of these is considered 
particularly reliable and that the others are included as a supplement. This could be tested by 
seeing if any of the CRAs has a greater impact on bond and stock prices. It would also be 
interesting to see if there has been any change in impact on bond and stock prices over time, 
hence implying that the belief in CRAs and their role or performance has changed over the 
years. Through this one could also find if the criticism towards the CRAs has led to any 
change in performance. None of these studies are, to your knowledge, performed before. 
   
Another topic suggested by Mtolcsy and Lianto (1995), which does not have to involve too 
many empirical studies, is to find out if, and in case why, there is a tendency that good news 
travel faster than bad news. Many studies do indicate this, as downgrades have a greater 
impact than upgrades.  
 
                                                 
77 The Bond Market Association (2006) 
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8. Conclusion  
 
Our study provides strong evidence that a negative credit rating announcement78 from S&P, 
Moody’s or Fitch leads to significant negative abnormal return for stocks listed on the OSE at 
the event day. The study does not show any significant results for the opposite being true for a 
positive announcement. Our findings are consistent with most of the results by previous 
studies performed on other financial markets. The rationale behind that only negative 
announcements have impact on stock prices is likely to be explained by the hypothesis of 
good news travelling faster than bad news. 
 
When studying downgrades in greater detail our study also indicates that unanticipated events 
lead to more drastic negative abnormal returns than anticipated ones, and that they also are 
more significant. The tendency is further that small firms, firms downgraded with several 
notches and firms within speculative grade react more than their counter categories for 
downgrade announcements. If a firm is downgraded and put on a negative watch list at the 
same time we also observe a larger negative abnormal return than what the case is for simple 
downgrades. Furthermore, being put on negative watch list impacts a stock return 
significantly negative. On the other hand an outlook placement, whether negative or positive, 
does not prove to give any significant abnormal returns. To compensate for a small sample of 
events we performed an additional event study for all negative announcements. This increased 
the significance level of the results already indicated in earlier sub-studies. Including some of 
the contaminated events in an event study has the same confirming affect on the results. In 
common for results of near all negative announcements is that the significant day seems to be 
the actual event day, and usually only this day.       
   
The observed substantial negative return in the 120 day window prior to the event indicates 
that the CRAs do not convey much new information to the market. The CRAs’ ratings seem 
in a large extent to reflect information already absorbed by the market. Though, as we observe 
the significant negative effect announcements have on stock returns on the event day, CRAs’ 
opinion does seem to matter for the financial markets. Still, this news seems to be efficiently 
reflected into the stock price, as no particular delays of abnormal return are observed.  
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In total, our observations show that CRAs to some extent are both leading and lagging the 
financial market. This seems like a natural position/role for the CRAs in modern finance, as it 
is difficult to always be in front of a highly efficient market. In light of the current situation on 
the world’s security markets it might seem as if this role is due for a small revision. The 
financial markets seem in profound need of more leading signals, to prevent bad securities 
from rotting the market from the inside. Hence, CRAs could play an even more important role 
in the future by focusing more on leading the financial markets away from danger, and less on 
echoing past sins. 
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9. Appendix 
 
 
Table A-1: Permanently Removed Events 
Event 
# Company Comment 
1.1.11 Telenor IPO 15/12-00 & event 12/1-01 
1.3.11 Storebrand Put on negative watchlist but also downgraded at same time 
2.1.15 Petroleum Geo-Serv. N.R. Not rated anymore 
2.2.7 Petroleum Geo-Serv. From N.R. 
2.3.4 Norsk Hydro Same date as merger announcement between Statoil and Hydro 
2.3.7 Ocean Rig Norway Same date as Moody's put on negative watchlist 
2.4.3 StatoilHydro Same date as merger announcement 
2.5.4 Norske Skog Moody's downgrade 2/11-2007,event date 22/10-2007 
2.5.8 Telenor Moody's put on negative watchlist 31/10-2005, keep Moody's,  
    remove this event (neg. Outlook 1/11-2005) 
2.6.2 DnB NOR Moody's has a negative watchlist announcement 3/4-2007 
2.6.5 Petroleum Geo-Serv. Same date as Moody's downgrade their rating on PGS 
 
Table A-2: Events Incl. only in Contaminated Study 
Event 
# Company Comment 
1.2.10 Ocean Rig 
No good explanation on Newsweb, but so extreme (-50% in event 
window) that something else has to be affecting return 
     
2.1.4 Norske Skog Moody's downgrade 1/4-08 (Ba2-B1) + positioning of ownership due to 
    voting power related to the upcoming annual general meeting 
2.1.9 Petroleum Geo-Serv. On event date: Preliminary 4th q results weaker than anticipated  
2.1.10 Petroleum Geo-Serv. Merger down the drain and negative 2nd q results on event date 
2.1.13 Petroleum Geo-Serv. EXTREMELY volatile stock 
2.1.16 Yara Strong 3rd quarter earnings announced 19.10.08, + in final negotiations  
    regarding an acquisition (both events positively received) 
2.2.8 Petroleum Geo-Serv. 27/07-2006: PGS disclosures disappointing 2nd quarter results 
2.3.8 Petroleum Geo-Serv. 1st q results disclosed one day before event date  
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Table A-3: Small / Large firm distinction 
      
Firm MarketCap (MNOK) Category 
DnB NOR 75 028 (Large) 
Norske Skogindustrier 3 528 (Small) 
Norsk Hydro 74 823 (Large) 
Ocean Rig 7 428 (Small) 
Petroleum Geo Services 17 997 (Small) 
SAS AB 4 162 (Small) 
StatoilHydro 532 962 (Large) 
Storebrand 13 979 (Small) 
Telenor 145 120 (Large) 
Yara 102 926 (Large) 
      
Note 1: Data taken from www.oslobors.com Wednesday 16.07.2008 
Note 2: We assume that the firms have been in the same category for the  
  entire period we have based our event study on 
 
 
For further details on our study please see the enclosed CD-ROM. Here you will find 
spreadsheets containing our event study, more detailed results and the historic rating changes 
provided us by the CRAs.   
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